POST WAR RECONSTRUCTION:
THE LESSONS OF EUROPE

A SYMPOSIUM AT THE LEBANESE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY
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INTRODUCTION

The symposium on the question of post war reconstruction, organized at the Lebanese American University in October 2018, came at a propitious time as the Arab world is beginning its slow recovery from the devastating wars that have levelled entire cities, destroyed historical landmarks, and most dramatically, uprooted entire communities that fled to safer places around the world. There is no question that the problematic of reconstruction creates an ambivalent condition between those who desire to resurrect the past, as it existed more or less before the war, and those who look at it as an opportunity to wipe the slate clean and project a new vision for the future.

Without pretending to have the answers to this problematic condition, this symposium sought to offer some insights into this complex issue, specifically drawing on the lessons of European countries that underwent similar, or even greater devastation during the Second World War, and then dealt with reconstruction according to different models. It was our purpose to bring these lessons to light, hoping that some of the mistakes of the past would not be repeated again in our present condition.

The problematic of post war reconstruction, from an architectural and urban design perspective, tends to focus exclusively on the material and logistical aspects of the problem, leaving the crucial dimension of political and social reconstruction to other discourses. The papers presented at this symposium, and the ensuing discussions and opinions expressed, were clearly indicative that these issues remain intricately connected, and cannot be separated easily. Although we did not aim within this context to address specifically the issues that go beyond the scope of the architectural and urban planning field, some of the speakers did venture into that territory, which in essence opens more complex questions to ponder. Primary among these questions is whether the project of reconstruction should be a privately-run initiative, as happened in Beirut after the Civil War of 1975-1990, or a collective project that involves the community in a genuine political framework. The experience of Beirut confirms that the reconstruction project cannot succeed fully without a greater engagement of the ‘citizenship’ at large.

In developing the proposal for this symposium, we have attempted to gather diverse voices from Eastern and Western Europe. The papers were therefore grouped together in three principal sessions: the first one focusing on France and Italy, the second one on the Polish experience, and the third session on utopian visions that transcend national boundaries. It is clear that some important references were missing, particularly the German experiences of the 1950’s and again of the 1980’s and 1990’s, which remain to be examined.

The keynote lecture was given by one of the major scholars on the question of reconstruction, Nicolas Bullock. A professor of architectural and planning history at Cambridge University, Bullock is also the author of the reference work on post war reconstruction in England: Building the Post war World, and his current research has extended to explore urban developments in France after World War II.
He has published extensively on architecture, planning and housing during the 19th and 20th centuries in Britain, France and Germany.

The concluding lecture was given by the President of the Order of Engineers & Architects in Beirut, Jad Tabet, whose experience in architectural practice and urban planning extended from Beirut to Paris, spanning across the rehabilitation and revitalization of traditional urban fabrics, to the development of strategies for sustainable community growth as well as social housing and public facilities.

Tabet has distinguished himself as one of the important critics of the post-war reconstruction of Beirut, and one of the major voices for the preservation of the ‘common wealth’, in the development of the city.

The project of reconstruction is inevitably a challenging project, but one that merits careful assessment and a willingness to engage all ‘shareholders’ in the process, as well as the intent to learn from the lessons of history. Any quick recipes, motivated by profit and the enticing glamour of contemporary city-branding will only lead to short-term effects that would not withstand the test of time, or would succeed only at the level of ‘real estate development’. Our cities, in this part of the world, are too precious to surrender to the temporary and often poorly thought out ‘solutions’ propagated by certain experts, without due attention to the ‘longue durée’ dimension of historical cities.

I want to take this opportunity to thank again the members of the Scientific Committee who assisted in the preparation of this symposium, particularly our colleagues from Cracow University of Technology, as well as the main sponsor of this event, Samir Khairallah and Partners, for their support.

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The symposium seeks to establish whether, after the devastation in parts of the Arab world, its reconstruction can profit from the lessons of European reconstruction after WWII. Naturally, much of the discussion will focus on what may be learnt from the experience of individual countries in both Western and Eastern Europe. The purpose of this introductory paper is to explore – looking across Europe – whether there are a number of common overarching themes that are to be found in one form or another in the rebuilding of each country, and whether these may be of value to reconstruction in the Arab World.

Examples of such themes might be the contrast between pre-war reliance on market forces and the new enhanced role played by the state in reconstruction, and the links between physical reconstruction and wider plans for transforming and modernizing post-war society. The paper will also touch on the tensions between programs of modernization and the attachment of so many to the lieux de mémoire, the memories and the physical reminders of the past, now irretrievably lost. How did these tensions shape the choice between simply rebuilding the past and the ambitions for radical reconstruction along CIAM principles?

Finally, the paper will conclude that the years of post-war reconstruction equipped Western Europe for the prosperity of the next 20 or so years, but raises the question whether, as wartime solidarities and the ideals of shared endeavor faded, the new order put in place by reconstruction served the interests of the many or the few?
But if this challenge was faced across Europe, the way in which reconstruction was carried out was particular to the nation state and, after 1947, these were increasingly divided from one another by the start of the Cold War. Many of the lessons of European reconstruction will relate to the experience of the individual nation state, and explaining this will be the task of my colleagues who alone have the expertise to do so. My task in introducing the discussion is to ask – if we can stand back far enough to look across Europe (or more accurately across Western Europe, given the very real limitations of my knowledge of events east of the Oder) – to see if there are a number of fundamental themes that are common. In seeking to frame these common themes, I leave it to my colleagues to judge their applicability to the particular case. And hopefully by the end of the day, we can identify yet further overarching themes of relevance to the Arab world.

To start with, there is the sheer scale of the destruction. Aerial photographs, whether the ruins of Le Havre in September 1944 or the seemingly lifeless shells of the tenements of Berlin in the summer of 1945, offer a vivid reminder of the extraordinary scale of the task that faced the nations of Europe at the end of WWII. In 1918, the destruction wrought by war, though intense, had been relatively limited: in France, for example, it had been concentrated in the 13 departments of the north-east. In 1945, by comparison, 74 of France’s 90 departments had suffered. Her cities, largely spared in 1918, had suffered too: Paris (but not its suburbs) may have escaped virtually unscathed, but Marseille and Lyon, the nation’s second and third largest cities were badly damaged, along with 15 of France’s 17 largest cities. Second-order cities (with a population of 50-100,000) fared no better with 21 out of 35 declared to be significantly war-damaged. What happened in France was matched in most other combatant nations in Western Europe. In the east, in Poland, the Ukraine, Russia, the scale of the damage was even more murderous.

Reconstruction: the new role of the state

Where was reconstruction to begin? In the interwar years, there was a general presumption across Europe (if not in Germany, where from the 1870s cities could make their own plans for growth) that the shap-
ing of the city was a matter for private enterprise and market forces. This was reflected not just in the decisions taken by private companies on the routes for new suburban rail lines or the London tube but equally in the resistance – in the name of the defence of the rights of property – to any comprehensive system of urban planning.

The lessons of reconstruction after WWI showed the limitations imposed by this presumption. In France, reconstruction, though funded by the state in the expectation of reparations from Germany, was to be left largely in the hands of those who had suffered. For the most part, their properties were to be rebuilt à l’identique without the agency of the state. In Britain, post-war ‘reconstruction’ (in effect the construction of social housing to resolve the acute post-war housing crisis caused by the fall in wartime house building) was not a success. The wartime command economy was dismantled quickly in 1918. As a result, there was no control of manpower and materials for reconstruction and the state found itself unable to enforce the priorities that it had set: it could not privilege housing over commercial developments which were more attractive to private enterprise as paying a higher return.

In 1945, however, reconstruction was to be different. The economy was broken. There could be no recourse to ‘market forces.’ More important, not just the scale of the task, but fundamental assumptions about the role of the state had been changed by the experience of war itself. In Britain, the state had been credited with winning the war, transforming popular perceptions of what it might legitimately now do: it had acquired a moral authority that flowed first from its success in organizing and marshalling the resources of the nation and, second, from the ‘fairness’ with which it had overseen the equality of sacrifice that had been demanded of the people in order to win the war. If the state could mobilize the country to win the war, could it not now do so again in order to ‘win’ the peace?

An important example of the new powers available to the state was the way in which wartime experience demanded a re-casting of the balance between the interests of the collective and the rights of individual property-owners. Since the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries in England and France – but not Germany – the progress of planning had been held back by the inability of the state to compel owners of property to accept that a plan might restrict their future use rights. In France, the powers provided by the Loi d’urbanisme of 1943 and in Britain the comparable powers granted under the Town and Country Planning Act 1947 nationalized the use rights (but not the ownership) of property, and at last guaranteed the right of the state to make and enforce compliance with a plan. The modernization of existing cities would have been impossible without the powers now given to the state.

With power went responsibility to meet the expectations of reconstruction. Britain was fortunate in the continuity of the state and the strength of the mandate it received in 1945 for a radical vision of reconstruction and the launch of the welfare state. But in other countries too, like France, Germany or Italy, the newly constituted state was required to direct post-war reconstruction. In France, de Gaulle’s government of left and right came to power with the expectation that it would transform France, rebuilding it politically, economically and physically in answer to the aspirations voiced by the resistance during the dark years of occupation. Across Europe, the state was now called
upon – and given the legal powers – to deliver a new post-war world, to plan the economy, to honour aspirations for a fairer society and to undertake physical reconstruction.

**Finding the Resources for Reconstruction**

However, the new responsibilities of the state were not matched by the availability of resources. Across Europe, national economies were shattered by the war. Those countries that had been occupied had seen their economies looted. Germany had taken without scruple raw materials, manpower and agricultural and industrial production to serve its war aims. To the east and in the west, the results were devastating: in France, for example, despite strenuous attempts to boost production, it would take years for the production of key materials like coal and steel to return to pre-war levels. Britain, victorious and never occupied, was barely any better off. Required to pay back to the US the loans that had financed the war, the country lacked the resources to build the ‘New Britain’ so often promised during the war. Across Europe, very large numbers of people lived in grossly inadequate temporary accommodation. Even in Britain, which had suffered much less than its continental neighbours, the number of new housing programs – the flagship policy of reconstruction – produced the most pitiful results: in London, only 16,500 dwellings had been completed five years after the war ended, a far cry from the 50,000 that the LCC had promised in 1941.

It was only with the arrival of Marshall aid from April 1948 – for Western, if not Eastern Europe – that the resources to realize the plans for reconstruction became available. With American dollars, Western Europe could now embark on those bold plans for modernization that were to lay the foundations for the next 30 or so years of prosperity. As the economies of Western Europe – Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands – revived, reconstruction got under way. But in return, Europe’s frontiers were now opened to US goods and culture: along with tractors came Hollywood films and Coca Cola.

If the revival of European economies was given an American flavor, it is important to see the plans proposed for physical reconstruction as part of a wider European vision – social and political – of modernization. Conceived not in isolation, they were seen from the start as a necessary component of wider plans for realizing ambitions nurtured during the war. Thinking about the transformation of old, worn-out and damaged cities was part of wartime speculation about ‘a better tomorrow’ so necessary to keep hope alive. In France, the resistance had dreamed and debated the forms of the new post-war France. In Britain, ideas for re-planning bombed cities were intimately linked to hopes for an economy managed for the many not for the few, for a universal system of education beyond the minimum school leaving age of 15, for a healthier and wealthier citizenry protected by a universal health service and provision of family allowances, and for provision for the old, the infirm and those unable to provide for themselves. Modern housing and rebuilt cities were seen as the natural complement to the social and economic policies of the new welfare state founded not on adversarial laws of competition, the dog-eat-dog rule of the market, but on an extension of the principles that emerged – however painfully – from the experience of the war. The belief in universal, collective benefits delivered through a system of historically high levels of taxation and a managed economy formed the basis for the social-democratic
consensus that, variously interpreted, would become the western European norm for the three post-war decades.

Reconstruction: Modernization versus Rebuilding

How was Europe to be rebuilt? If there was a deep-seated desire on the part of all to rebuild as quickly as possible, there were deep divisions on how this was to be done. On the one hand was the widespread if paradoxical desire of the people to return to a familiar past, to the pre-war world as they now remembered it in happy retrospect but shorn of its failings: a world without the unemployment, the poverty, the slums of the '20s and '30s or the gross inequalities of pre-war society. After the turmoil of the war, the old remembered certitudes might easily appear to many as more enticing than the bracing prospect of a brave new world. There were, too, good pragmatic reasons for wanting a return to a familiar past: would a rebuilt city offer to the landlord or the shopkeeper the advantages of location – the spot on the high street – that they had enjoyed before the war? Why, asked so many – particularly those who were suffering because of the war, the homeless or those living in temporary shelter – why wait for the outcome of the cumbrous machinery of planning when so much could simply be repaired or rebuilt as it had been?

For others defending the past and the memories associated with familiar landmarks were bound up with the larger and more challenging issues of defining the present. To many people retaining these landmarks, so often badly damaged or barely reparable, was what gave identity to a local community: in Coventry, it might be the burnt-out ruins of the cathedral; in Saint-Malo, the granite façades of the walled city; in Berlin, the Kaiser Wilhelm Gedächtniskirche; across Europe, there were calls to defend the key lieux de mémoire.

On the other hand were those – planners, architects, engineers – who had long championed the case for a radical extension of planning powers, an agenda now largely adopted by the state as part of the post-war drive for modernization. In some countries, this might be at the level of central government, for example the centralizing stance of M.R.U in France, in others, such as Britain, it was cities like Coventry and London that took the lead. Modernizing planners welcomed reconstruction as a unique, one-off opportunity to sweep away the failings of existing cities. Their more extreme proposals might be tempered by the constraints of budgetary realism and they might not agree on the form of the modern city. But they were agreed that to miss this opportunity for transforming European cities would be unpardonable and might set back the case for planning for decades.

But even amongst those demanding that the opportunities presented by reconstruction should not be lost, there were real divisions of approach reinforced by divisions between those of different generations. Many of the plans made earlier in the war, for example, in France for the towns along the Loire like Gien, Sully and Orléans in the winter of 1940 and early 1941 were prepared by those like Royer and Bardet whose ideas were shaped by planning agenda of the interwar years. Their plans called for adjustments to the existing fabric of the towns to manage traffic more efficiently, to reduce the number of incompatible adjacent land uses through zoning and to open out the densest and most insanitary areas. The architectural proposals, too, were generally respectful of regional character and local materials and detailing lovingly reported
In journals like Architecture Française. In Britain, early wartime plans often envisaged a continuation of Garden City ideas and designs couched in the vernacular manner. The ideas of Abercrombie and Forshaw for the County of London Plan and the proposals drawn up by Sharp, Halford and other members of the planning establishment were framed in a manner that lay somewhere between the ideas of Garden City movement and the Beaux Arts, an ambiguity captured in the contents of the Town Planning Review where the ideas of Unwin lay alongside the Beaux Arts-inspired schemes of the Liverpool Planning School.

These ideas were soon being overtaken by a more radical modernism. Gibson’s 1941 proposals for the reconstruction of Coventry, tame by the standards of the later 1940s, were seen to be excitingly new to the Labour councillors whom he encouraged to read Lewis Mumford’s The Culture of Cities as a preparation for the modernizing of their city. But it was the publication of Le Corbusier’s Charter of Athens in 1943 that introduced a new paradigm for post-war reconstruction. Based on ideas already set out in La Ville Radieuse (1935) and claiming the authority of CIAM, it offered a decisive break with the planning of the interwar and early war years. With its argument for the provision of vertical neighborhoods to ensure space, sun and greenery for all and the separation of the road network from building lines and pedestrian routes, it anticipated the construction of the Unité d’habitation in Marseille and inspired others to follow the same ‘logic’ to the new urbanism: Marcel Lods’ rebuilding of the railway suburb, Sotteville-lès-Rouen, or Pierre Vivien’s three brightly coloured, 12-story slabs on Quai Gambetta in Boulogne are only some of the earlier developments conceived in this manner. CIAM’s endorsement of the Charter of Athens as the basis for post-war reconstruction at CIAM 7 in Bergamo in 1949 encouraged the development of an approach to rebuilding the city that was unashamedly different from the bustling diversity and the mixture of activities that were, notwithstanding wartime destruction, still the norm in the streets, squares and market places of most European cities. But even before the end of European reconstruction, members of CIAM’s younger generation, soon called Team X, were questioning the new orthodoxy and calling for a new approach to urbanism that recognized and drew on the animation and vitality of the traditional European city.

Reconstruction: Judging the Results

Ten years after the war, as the various programmes of ‘reconstruction’ gave way to what was now simply called ‘construction,’ contemporaries took stock of what had been achieved. For the progressive architectural journals like the Architectural Review, Casabella and Architecture d’aujourd’hui, the results fell far short of earlier aspirations. A ‘modern’ architecture might now be the default style for housing, offices, shopping centres and public buildings across Europe but it was only a pallid, bloodless simulacrum of the true modernist vision that might have been achieved. From the bland timidity of the ‘style MRU’ in France to Britain’s despised ‘contemporary modernism,’ progressives felt that, with notable exceptions – Le Corbusier’s Unité d’habitation, the LCC’s Festival Hall – the opportunities had been squandered. But this elitist judgment, failed to recognize how much reconstruction had done to lay the physical foundations for Western Europe’s three decades of post-war modernization, for France’s Trente Glorieuses, for Germany’s Wirtschaftswunder and Italy’s Miraculo Economico. How, unchanged, would the pre-war cities of
Europe have been able to meet the needs of growing car-ownership, for modern housing to accommodate those moving from the countryside to the cities, for the facilities to meet the growing leisure time increasingly available to a more affluent society? In defence of what had been achieved, planners and leaders of city government could point to the way that the program of changes launched during the reconstruction years had transformed and ‘modernized’ European cities almost beyond recognition: industrialized construction of mass housing offered families a level of physical amenities beyond the hopes of the pre-war working class; public transport brought home and work closer together or bridged the distance between suburb and center for those who chose to commute; provision for the motorcar, now virtually universally available, gave families a freedom to enjoy leisure unimaginable in the early post-war years.

But could the very state that had been so readily entrusted to direct post-war reconstruction be trusted to be even-handed and impartial? Yes, reconstruction did indeed lay the foundations for the transformation of post-war Europe, but who were the beneficiaries of the new order that emerged as modernization got under way? As the memories of wartime solidarity and shared sacrifice faded, politics across Europe seemed too often to move to the right. For many, particularly on the left, a new question now arose: did the new order put in place during reconstruction serve the interests of the many or the few?
The French Reconstruction after World War II: A Laboratory for Repairing the Present and Preparing for the Future

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ABSTRACT

This paper will expound on the characteristics of the reconstruction process after World War II in France, and the urban and architectural forms that were put in place.

With the entire French territory hit by urban destruction, reconstruction was fully state-funded. For this purpose, the French government set up a specific ministry called MRU (Ministère de la reconstruction et de l’urbanisme) that implemented the same policy throughout the national territory. Restoring destroyed cities to their original state was not considered an option. The ambition was to take advantage of the opportunity to develop modern, functional, healthy and orderly, but also aesthetic cities, where history would be highlighted by urban planning. Thus, most of the ancient monuments were preserved and isolated, and new roads designed to render them visible.

In large cities, urban planning was rethought following the rules of classical French aesthetics and the imperatives of modernity: adaptation to the automobile, health, sunshine, equipment. The street network and the plot plan were completely redesigned. The MRU set up a system of evaluation of destroyed properties to enable a compensation equivalent (but not identical) to the disappeared housing. This new urban modernity was not as radical as that advocated by the avant-garde of the CIAM. The urban design and the architecture that finally emerged were the outcome of compromises. A number of traditional features were retained, such as sloping roofs or the continuity of building elevations along streets. But there were also some experiments aimed at inventing new urban forms, which increased with time. French post-war reconstruction therefore appears as an urban laboratory, prefiguring the massive construction of housing in the 1960s and 1970s.

Even today, worldwide, many cities need rebuilding as a result of war destruction. The lesson that can be learned from the French reconstruction is its capacity to compromise in order to combine tradition and innovation. It allowed the victims to preserve the memory of the past and to adapt to a completely renovated living environment.

Our examples will be mainly the cities of Le Havre and Caen, which represent two different aspects of this reconstruction. But we will also draw on the reconstruction of Orléans, Saint-Malo, Saint-Lô and Lisieux, to illustrate the variety of solutions imagined in the fifties.
In France, debates concerning the aesthetics, hygiene and functionality of cities emerged at the beginning of the 20th century. However, several decades later, these deliberations had not yet been put into practice. On the eve of World War II, cities were in crisis; they were dirty, overcrowded and sunless. Urban planners realized that war destruction was an opportunity to modernize these cities. According to the architect Henry Bernard: "The rebuilding of French real estate capital demolished by war is only an incomplete aspect of the problem [...] there is another aspect on which we will continue to insist, because it encompasses and goes beyond the previous [...] it is the update of France, with its fifty years of delay, and its effective reconstruction for fifty or a hundred years to come.”

The destruction began in June 1940, at the time of the German invasion. The cities near the German border were badly hit, as were those of the valleys of the Seine and the Loire. During the war, allied bombings targeted the railway stations of major cities. They also targeted strategic sites such as major ports or the fortified sites of the Atlantic Wall. The Liberation brought with it further destruction in Normandy, Provence, Alsace, in the Rhone Valley and the north. By the end of hostilities, in 1945, the entire national territory had been damaged.

All successive French governments from 1940 onwards regarded reconstruction as a great national cause. Reconstruction was a necessity for all those affected and was of vital importance to the country’s economy as the destruction was concentrated in big cities and the richest regions. With the creation of the Vichy Government following the June 1940 defeat, its head, Maréchal Pétain, set up an anti-democratic and authoritarian government. Although submissive to the German occupation, it tried to demonstrate to the French that the sovereignty of France was intact. Thus, the government began to think about reconstruction and created administrative and regulatory frameworks for it. In November 1944, after the first elections following the Liberation, the new democratic government resumed, without major changes, the administrative and regulatory structures of the previous regime, and launched the effective reconstruction.

**The Organization of the Reconstruction**

The Provisional Government organized the solidarity of all the French in the face of war damage. The State thus financed all damages: movable, immovable, industrial, agricultural and urban. The Ministry of Reconstruction and Urbanism (MRU) was responsible for the entire reconstruction process. It distributed the funds, selected the architects by means of a list of approval, and imposed its architectural and urban doctrine. This administration included local services to enforce state policy around destruction and carried out the preliminary operations of demining and clearing the ruins. It also took care of the temporary rehousing of the victims, by buying or building prefabricated temporary houses.

Each building affected was the subject of an evaluation dossier intended to serve as a basis for financing its reconstruction. An architect evaluated this cost using a complex scale, controlled by the MRU. The result was a debt for war damage, due by the State to the disaster victim, who was required by the legislation to join a reconstruction cooperative. These organizations grouped together several hundred disaster victims, and were responsible for managing the rebuilding.

[1] « La réédification du capital immobilier français démoli par faits de guerre n’est qu’un aspect incomplet du problème [...] il y a un autre aspect sur lequel nous ne cesserons d’insister, parce qu’il englobe et dépasse le précédent [...] c’est la mise à jour de la France, avec ses cinquante années de retard, et sa reconstruction effective pour les cinquante ou cent années à venir. » Henry Bernard, Hommes et mondes, n. 7, 1947.
Cooperatives chose the architects, defined the program according to the available claim of war damage, followed the construction site in the name of the victims, received State money to pay the architects and the building companies, and assured the transmission of title deeds. The State thus ensured that the claim was used to rebuild demolished dwellings and that the new buildings were in keeping with its principles of comfort and modernity.

In each disaster-stricken town, the ministry appointed an urban planner, whose role was not to design the whole city with all its buildings, but rather to draw up a master plan and determine some architectural, aesthetic and functional codes. The urban planners also completely redesigned the road networks with wider and more regular streets. They usually planned new routes in order to improve traffic flow and keep nuisances out of transit traffic, and they divided the city into functional zones. There was at least one dense commercial core area surrounded by a residential-only area. One or more industrial zones were planned, away from housing areas and close to communication routes.

These improvements also applied to parts of the city that had not been destroyed. New destructions could thus be planned, for example, to build new roads. Nonetheless, the State did not fund planned improvements outside the bombed areas. Consequently, these were only carried out much later and with difficulty. Some were never completed.
while in the war damaged areas the transformations were applied as provided for in the plan.

Due to the new street layout, the reparrelling of the land preceded the construction of buildings. The reconstruction cooperatives conducted this complex process from their disaster victim dossiers.

In each town, an Architecte en Chef supervised architectural reconstruction projects. His role was to control the conformity of his colleagues’ projects with the master plan codes and to ensure the homogeneity of the city. He thus determined the aesthetic guidelines: the visual principles, the materials and the volume of the urban ensemble.

Urban Aesthetics

The State wanted an urban aesthetic inspired by the national classical tradition, based on the culture disseminated by the École des Beaux-Arts in Paris. The urban achievements of French architects in the Age of Enlightenment were the reference: the royal squares of Paris, the plan of Washington by L’Enfant, the great crossings of Tours or Orléans under Louis XV, the front of the quays in Bordeaux, etc. Other
models included the reconstruction of Rennes after the fire of 1720 by Jacques V Gabriel, and, outside France, that of Lisbon after the earthquake of 1755. The Reconstruction program was not simply about rebuilding cities but, more importantly, about improving them through regularizing roads and buildings, rethinking facilities and services and ensuring architectural unity.

The intention of reconstructed cities, both in the 1950s as in the 18th century, was to portray the image of a state that was both strong and fair, and that harmoniously distributed functions and social categories in the urban space. The desired values were readability, clarity and harmony. The space design was hierarchical, with boulevards, squares or walks forming the aesthetic and functional framework of the city. Noble and ambitious architecture marked the urban thresholds (passage from one zone to another, bridgehead, entrance into the center). In Blois for example, a semi-circular plaza inspired by the Place des Victoires in Paris demarcated the opening of the bridge over the Loire. In Caen, two residential pavilions narrowing the space defined the passage between the Place de la Resistance and the Avenue du Six-Juin, in the manner of the urban compositions of the 18th century.

The reconstitution of a city’s personality implied respect for its inherited monuments. The historic monuments were the ornament of the new city; the architects located the streets so as to enhance these buildings, and to make them more visible in the cityscape. In Orléans, the Ministry of Reconstruction rebuilt an exact replica of the Rue Royale, built around 1760 by Jean Huppeau. Two parallel lanes, added on both sides, allowed the accommodation of sufficient traffic flow. In Caen, the churches of Saint-Jean and Saint-Pierre and the castle were major elements in the layout of the reconstruction plan. Largely unobstructed, these three monuments structure the urban space and punctuate the silhouette of the city.

Highlighting the physical site could also help establish the new character of a city. For example, Saint-Lô was built on a rocky outcropping. The urban planner, André Hilt, accentuated this geographical particularity by clearing the cliffs that surrounded the historical center of the city.
He transformed the upper town, which was difficult to access, into an administrative and residential area while laying out the active and commercial city around the base of the rock.

Finally, the chief architects carefully selected the building material of the façades, which gave the city its face. The preference was for local and traditional materials, which could link with the preserved monuments. The Architectes en Chef of Dunkerque, Lisieux and Beauvais chose brick. The one in Caen decided on calcareous stone. In Saint-Malo, the Architecte en Chef opted for granite, while shale carried the day in Saint-Lô.
Urban Research

Respect for the past and traditional models was not contradictory to the search for new solutions. The great master of French architecture back then, Auguste Perret, was the proof. He had invented a new language, based on the most modern material of the time, reinforced concrete, but he had not forgotten the classical tradition. His architecture used columns, cornices or vertical windows, following the traditional rules of constructive harmony and architectural coherence. The Ministry of Reconstruction was therefore convinced of the need to launch research sites to open avenues toward the future.

It therefore conducted experiments on urban planning in small towns. Le Corbusier was thus named urban planner of Saint-Dié (20,000 inhabitants). He conceived a radical plan where the city was transformed into a huge park. He planned to group administrative functions in a high-rise building, with dwellings concentrated in Unités d’Habitation. Low buildings, planned in an area separate from the dwellings and on the other side of the river, housed the shops.

When presented in New York, this urban project aroused much interest, but the local population violently rejected it, thus the Ministry decided to appoint another, more traditional planner. In Sotteville-les-Rouen, in the suburbs of Rouen, Marcel Lods imagined a similar formula, with the realization of large housing bars in the middle of a large field. He planned two Zone Vertes but only one was partially completed. Here again, the reluctance of the population to accept these new formulas explains this failure.

Elsewhere, experimentation was more limited. Although less radical and smaller, these experiments were based on the same principles as Le Corbusier. The goal was to place the buildings away from the street, to disconnect housing from shops, to give air, light and sun to all the apartments and to lay out the site in a collective and public way, like a big garden.

In Caen, along the rue Saint-Michel, the architect inserted the housing at an angle to the street and created small triangular squares. Single-story commercial buildings connect them, and the buildings are arranged around small gardens. Urban innovation combines here with a very traditionally inspired architecture. In the same city, the group of Tours Marine concentrates the dwellings in towers of nine levels. Single-story commercial buildings also connect the towers. The composition forms a monumental avenue, which magnifies this major route of the reconstruction plan.
The research also focused on construction techniques. The goal was to build faster and cheaper, but without forgetting quality and architectural aesthetics. There were two main tendencies: heavy bearing wall and light frame construction. They were summarized in an ironic way in the architectural press by the formula “crustaceans and vertebrates.”
On the crustacean side, the walls were thick and heavy. The justification for this technique was that concrete was a cheap and available material. The difficulty was finding an exterior appearance of good visual quality. The most notable technique is that of the architect Pol Abraham, who developed a permanent formwork to mold the wall. Prefabricated plates formed the outer and inner faces of the wall. Combined with prefabricated window frames, both faces were raised to the height of one story and then filled with concrete. The system also made it possible to do so without scaffolding.

On the vertebrate side, Perret was the principal representative of this tendency toward a light architecture where the load-bearing elements were limited to a few elements, such as columns, beams, and floor slabs. Builders erected the load-bearing structure first before inserting prefabricated infill elements. The result was an architecture where the different elements of the wall were clearly identified, and where multiple reliefs animated the surfaces.

Both currents simultaneously reflected on the prefabrication of building elements, and the evolution of this research eventually led to heavy prefabrication becoming the main construction system in the 1960s. This system mobilized prefabricated room-size modules requiring powerful means of transport and lifting.
The Modernist Turn of 1950

Starting in 1950, the Ministry of Reconstruction created new, much more radical, guidelines covering the entire city. The minister was Eugène Claudius-Petit, admirer of Le Corbusier. Deeply convinced of the need to invent cities much more in step with the times, he proposed more advantageous financing formulas that were conditioned on respect for new urban rules. The objectives were the same as in previous experiments, but they now applied to large ensembles in which modernity had to be visually much more assertive.

The Ministry of Reconstruction now demanded the building of very large housing ensembles in order to lower costs and speed up reconstruction. It encouraged the search for new constructive solutions such as prefabrication. It required the disassociation between buildings and streets in order to let air and light penetrate into the houses, and to finish with narrow and closed streets. Finally, it sought to express this new impetus through modern and rational architectural forms.

This new orientation appeared at a time when the reconstruction was already well underway, so that in some cities modern logics were in direct contact with traditional systems. In Caudebec-en-Caux, half of the city is organized in traditional closed blocks, with houses that have high tile roofs. However, after 1954, the Architecte en Chef concentrated half of the remaining dwellings to be rebuilt in a single large curved building winding through the city. In Caen, a single architect, Henry Delacroix, designed the quarter of Quatrans, with 400 dwellings on five blocks. He drew a series of parallel bars, dominated by an 11-story tower. The ground was entirely collective and public, alternating squares and gardens, without any private or closed plots. The accumulation of all these experiences kept cities away from the unity originally hoped for but architects avoided chaos by seeking solutions to maintain the link between all these logics. For example, the use of a traditional building material was able to make the connection with the reconstruction of the first phase and further with the historic city.

Caen: a bar of the quarter of Quatrans and the tower of 11 levels seen from the castle. The district is established independently of historic monuments or spared blocks.

Le Havre, Saint-Malo, Royan

The centralization of financial means and aesthetic and urban policy within a single ministry could have standardized the reconstructed cities. Nonetheless, this was not the case, and identical procedures had quite different results. Three examples will illustrate this diversity: Le Havre, Royan and Saint-Malo.

Le Havre, Saint-Malo, Royan

The centralization of financial means and aesthetic and urban policy within a single ministry could have standardized the reconstructed cities. Nonetheless, this was not the case, and identical procedures had quite different results. Three examples will illustrate this diversity: Le Havre, Royan and Saint-Malo.
Le Havre is a fairly recent town with few historic monuments. Before the war, the building was essentially modern, dating from the 19th century. An industrial and port city, it was turned toward the open sea, and constituted the largest transatlantic port of France. In 1944, Auguste Perret’s former students lobbied the Ministry of Reconstruction for their teacher to obtain the reconstruction of a large French city. He was indeed considered the greatest living master of French architecture. His notoriety was based on his ability to invent modernity by becoming part of the great classical tradition. Therefore, Perret was named Architecte en Chef of Le Havre.

The pupils of the Perret workshop made some proposals to radically redesign the urban form. For his part, Perret imagined a city elevated on an artificial slab. These proposals were not retained. The old city layout finally inspired the reconstruction plan, with the streets simply being widened and regularized. Perret arranged a very hierarchical system on this street structure. Three major avenues – rue de Paris, avenue Foch, boulevard François 1er – surrounded the city center, articulated by three squares marked by monumental ensembles: the Place de l'Hôtel de Ville, the Porte Océane, and the Front de Mer Sud. With these towers emerging from the silhouette of the city, Perret took advantage of the concentration of housing to animate the urban landscape. The paths, squares and gardens were arranged following a scholarly game of expansion and contraction of space and views. For architecture, he imposed rules based on a frame of 6.24 meters, as well as rooftop terraces. This framework allowed the development of an architectural language specific to Perret, based on the development of reinforced concrete, treated as a noble material, and on the load-bearing structure.

Saint-Malo was the opposite of Le Havre. It was a very old city, with narrow and winding streets, surrounded by a continuous wall. The town planner Marc Brillaud de Laujardière, designed a new roadway, regularized and enlarged, but he retained Saint Malo’s flexible and complicated character, very different from the orthogonal checkerboard of Le Havre. Assisted by the mayor of the city Guy Lachambre, the Architecte en Chef Louis Arretche set up architectural rules to reconstruct the old urban silhouette of the city within its ramparts. The ministry agreed to finance the extra cost of high slate roofs and of the granite for the facades. From afar, one seems to be seeing the city of corsairs protected by the medieval wall, but as you approach, the modernity of the design of the façades is clearly visible. The permeability of the blocks, where central space is entirely public, also compensated for reconstructing the network of narrow and tortuous

Saint-Malo before the war and after reconstruction
roads. The third example is the city of Royan, a recent seaside resort, entirely dedicated to leisure and holidays. The seafront, an amphitheater facing the beach, was the most important building. First, the Architect en Chef Claude Ferret imagined a great classical composition, with a triumphal avenue perpendicular to the beach. However, he later modified the planned architectural forms in a much more modernist sense. Brazilian architecture, with its sensual curves and sun protection devices, inspired the final design. For the seafront, he drew a large continuous curve with a portico supporting an accessible terrace at its center. At ground level, a covered gallery allowed pedestrians to walk along the shops sheltered from the sun. The rest of the city presents several re markable buildings in the same playful and sculptural spirit: the covered market, the Notre-Dame church, the casino, the convention center, and several villas.

Conclusion

French Reconstruction after 1944 had a strong modernizing ambition. It was to prepare cities for the next 50 years. Despite the centralization of the process, the French State made the reconstruction an exceptional laboratory on the modern city. It promoted many experimental projects, both urban and architectural, on functional, financial, social and artistic issues. Even if the State pushed aside the current of radical modernity, it allowed the expression of many other architectural trends, more in step with the social and cultural reality of the country. The new cities of the reconstruction were never radically different from those they replaced. Chosen solutions were adapted to the character, history and functions of the city. The result is a reasonable compromise between modernity and tradition, which considers objective facts such as geography, climate or economic activities, but also immaterial meanings such as harmony, memory, or the Genius Loci. Sixty years after their completion, this ability to make the link with the cultural universe of the inhabitants is the most interesting lesson of the reconstruction of French cities after World War II.
In the aftermath of World War II, in 1945, Milan was largely destroyed. Monuments and houses, parks and transportation systems – in effect, the whole city and its center – were heavily damaged. The age of reconstruction was faced with a host of problems that posed important architectural and theoretical questions: the loss of a great number of monuments that represented the identity of the city, the destruction of many historical residential blocks and the large need for housing – a pre-war concern – that would increase in the following two decades due to industrial development. Tackling these problems led to a renewal of architecture and the city.

During this period, an important school of architects was forming in Milan – at the time, one of the most vital cities in Italy for its cultural and economic activities – together with a group of intellectuals, philosophers, poets and artists. The head of this group of architects working in both Milan and Venice (Albini, Gardella, Figini e Pollini, Bottoni) was Ernesto Rogers, the director of Casabella Continuità, the leading architectural magazine at the time.

To be truly modern, he claimed it was necessary to look at history and study the construction principles of historical cities: not to imitate forms but to preserve their own identity. The idea of continuity would bridge tradition and modernity. But what did continuity mean in architecture and which direction did this research take?

One of the most outstanding and discussed results of these ideas was the Velasca Tower, the first modern high-rise building in reinforced concrete built in the historical city center: a new typology realized with modern materials, with shapes that seemed to refer to Milan’s medieval history. The architectural team was BBPR (Banfi, Belgiojoso, Peressutti, Rogers) together with a well-known engineer, Arturo Danusso. It was too modern, and at the same time too old. For this reason, the English critic Reyner Banham accused the Italian architects of retreating from modern architecture. This debate marked a change in Italian architecture.

Few relevant monuments were rebuilt or restored as they were before the war – such as the Teatro alla Scala and some partially destroyed churches – and other public buildings were completed in different forms, like the Renaissance-era Ospedale Maggiore by Filarete. But the best built projects attempted to overcome both the philological reconstruction and the last experiences of the International Style, while facing the problems of the construction principles of the city and of the role of green spaces as collective urban places. The research moving toward a modern architecture that was closely related to the an idea of tradition was especially applied to the reconstruction of the residential blocks of the city center – projects by Bottoni, Asnago e Vender, Moretti – and to the construction of the new settlements – QT8, Harar and Feltre among the most interesting ones.

In the meantime, scientific studies of the city, its structure and its architecture took root: the research on the relationships between typology and morphology originated from this interest to better understand historical cities so that the history of each may continue.
It is not easy to summarize the challenges Italy faced with reconstruction at the end of World War II in 1945. I will try to focus on some of the mutually intertwined and superimposed issues that I consider most important, which steered subsequent developments in architecture and defined what I believe to be the most important Italian contribution to architectural culture between the early 1950s and the late 60s: the attempt to tackle the study of the city on a scientific basis – the foundation and indispensable prerequisite to architecture.

Needless to say, what I am proposing is an interpretation, whose prime movers were architects from multiple generations who belonged to the Schools of Milan and Venice.

The images that glide past show the studies, projects and achievements of those years that belong to this research.

I will begin with Milan, my own city, among those most affected by the destruction of the war, due to its strategic role in the economy of the country, when the allied army sought to force the Fascist government into submission by annihilating the production power of the industrial cities of the north. Wave upon wave of air attacks struck the city indiscriminately, causing 2,000 civilian deaths. Milan suffered considerable damage, much more than one could imagine: around 25 percent of its assets were destroyed, and between 50 percent and 75 percent damaged. The city lost at least a third of its buildings and about 75 percent of its arboreal heritage: the rubble would be used to realize Monte Stella, the hill of the new QT8 district designed by Piero Bottoni.

Unlike Eastern European countries, Milan and the Italian cities were not completely razed to the ground, even though this had been the explicit goal of the first bombardments. The urban structure remained recognizable although the destruction spread throughout the city; many important historical and monumental buildings with which the city was identified were affected – the Teatro alla Scala, Ca’ Granda, the ancient hospital of Filarete, the churches of Sant’Ambrogio, Santa Maria delle Grazie by Bramante, and many others. In addition, a substantial part of the residential fabric of the old town was jeopardized along with the urban transport network, while railway depots and rail yards, and some industrial areas were bombed.

After the war, Italy found itself at a very fragile and critical juncture. Devastated and divided, it showed even more clearly the great inequalities between the north and the south of the country. Neorealist literature and cinema would denounce this dramatic disparity (Christ Stopped at Eboli stands for all): a condition of great backwardness and a substantially agricultural economy in the south, as opposed to much greater wealth to the north, with an industrial development since the 1800s that had become so rapid that it had caused phenomena of mass immigration, urbanization, and congested expansion of the cities.

The post-war period in Milan therefore had to deal with many difficult issues: the urgent ones of reconstruction were added to those of its rapid growth, which now underwent a drastic acceleration, imposing urgent reflection on the principles of the city’s expansion and the building of its new parts. Inevitably, in the urgency of the reconstruction, projects and realizations also followed conflicting roads. Different
situations, each individual, were resolved on a case by case basis: from a faithful reconstruction of the original parts of monumental buildings that had collapsed the Teatro alla Scala, the restoration of Santa Maria delle Grazie, to the completion of buildings which reproduced the spatial characteristics in different forms – Ca’ Granda by Filarete, now a State University, for example – to the consolidation of the voids that had been created by the bombing – the Vetra area becoming the Basilicas Park. Quality, destination, the memories haunting the lost monuments, buildings and places, in these cases guided decisions with regard to the roads to be undertaken for these individual interventions.

The cultural climate in Milan is among the liveliest and most interesting. A hotbed of ideas and experiments in all the fields of the arts and sciences and philosophy, a privileged place for the processing of architectural thought, experimentation with the themes so dear to European Rationalism, but also much questioning of the more jaded postulates of the International Style. In this climate, a cultural debate around the architecture and the city developed; a debate starring a sizeable group of architects of the Enlightenment tradition and Rationalist model, Ernesto Nathan Rogers, Ignazio Gardella, Franco Albini, Figini and Pollini, Piero Bottoni, and many others. These gave life to a school of thought that looked to Ernesto Rogers’ magazine Casabella Continuità and to the Faculty of Architecture, which would result in intense exchanges and lasting relationships with the Institute of Architecture of Venice guided in those years by Giuseppe Samonà. The themes of the research that the two schools developed were similar and complementary, also because many of the protagonists of this period were working between the two cities. The problems of reconstruction intertwined consciously with those of the aspiration for a modernity that did not reject its own history along with a search for scientific tools to operate on architecture and the city, laying the foundations for a disciplinary refoundation that remains the theoretical basis of the training of many Italian architects.

When it comes to a city destroyed by a sudden and violent event, a war – but also an earthquake – the problem that appears most difficult if not the most urgent, is the reconstruction of an identity, a cultural identity reflected in the form of places that have been abruptly destroyed but are still alive in the memory of the inhabitants. A condition that shows the irreconcilable contrast between the lost forms it wishes to preserve or recover, and the original raison d’être of those forms, rooted in a past that is often very remote.

How can we reconstruct an identity without falsifying or betraying it? How can we retie the threads of history between tradition and modernity, the past, and the need to move on?

In Milan, an attempt was made to give the idea of modernity a new interpretation far from formal stylistic features, to redefine a role for architecture where it would be seen as civil commitment: a disciplinary commitment that meant knowledge and adherence to a culture, and an ability to understand, interpret and represent this in corresponding, generic, congruent forms, able to bring and restore identity to places and things. In this operation, history played a key part, since it is the foundation of every culture, necessary for an understanding of reality.

Counter to each proclamation of a part of the Modern Movement
beyond the Alps, modernity was no longer defined in opposition to history: between history and the present time there is a relationship of continuity, a term coined by Ernesto Rogers, who associated it with the title of the magazine Casabella, that would become the emblem and guide of concerted research.

Rogers brings history back inside the idea of modernity: a tradition that endures is recognized, one that resists change, a bottomless core of culture and civilization kept alive over time. In architecture coexist a general, implacable element, and a particular element that is mutable. The former derives from the meaning of what is built – from the meaning of the house, the theater, the themes of the works of architecture – that which is stable throughout the epochs of history and represents the tradition that endures in the life and culture of humankind, a substance which takes different forms in time. The latter, the particular element, concerns the contingent reality and the changing conditions through which values are manifested. In this sense, tradition and modernity are complementary, indispensable to one another, so that architecture can be implemented and fulfill its tasks. Modernity is none other than a continuous and renewed interpretation of tradition, of what is still alive of history.

The manifesto of this thesis, shared by many Rationalist architects of Rogers’ generation (Ignazio Gardella, Franco Albini) and by the younger students who worked at the Study Center of Casabella (Aldo Rossi, Guido Canella, Vittorio Gregotti, etc.), was the realization of Torre Velasca in those years. A work of the BBPR studio (Banfi, Belgiojoso, Peressutti, Rogers) and of the engineer Arturo Danusso, a professor at the Polytechnic, its publication prompted the well-known controversy with Reyner Banham who accused Italian architecture of betrayal and of having “retreated” from modern architecture.

The Velasca building was among the first residential towers built in Italy and in Europe. In addition to implementing the most advanced thought on the relationship between architecture and engineering, it addressed another crucial issue for architecture and the construction of the city: the tower is a disruptive new type and, from the point of view of urban relationships, a tall building located right at the center of the old town, in direct conflict with the spires of the Cathedral, and realized using state-of-the-art materials and techniques.

Deeming the indications of the municipality absolutely inadequate for the rebuilding of the destroyed lot by using closed high-density blocks with small gloomy internal courtyards, the BBPR proposed to concentrate the entire volume in a single high-rise building, self-standing, and quite separate from the surrounding blocks. This allowed them to give form to the voids between the buildings that were created, organizing a public square to replace the streets defined by the frontage.

The tower creates a very strong contrast with its surroundings. It introduces into the urban setting a new subject and a new relationship principle which, for the BBPR, became perfectly legitimate in the dialogue with the surrounding fabric with its low-medium height and the centrality of its position, with the need to introduce new features and landmarks into a city that needed to be reborn, to grow on itself. With great lucidity, understanding and a few doubts, in an article in L’Architettura of 1959, Giuseppe Samonà, the other great teacher of
Italian architecture in the post-war period, recognized the exceptionality of Torre Velasca precisely in its “new dimension” of building and in the new relationships that the tower established with the city, pondering on the elements of continuity with the context, which he also glimpsed in the tower.

This choice would provoke much discussion. The BBPR did not reject a priori the new type of tall, modern and disruptive building in European cities, by dint of an adjustment to the surrounding fabric. Indeed, the theme of the relationship with the context, the need to pay attention to environmental pre-existences – another term proposed by Rogers – and to establish between the historical city and new works of architecture a relationship of continuity which was not only mimetic but accepted and able to interpret the new conditions, was just one of the themes of the research of those years.

Continuity, Ernesto Rogers maintained, admits and indeed expects a transformation or change since continuity does not concern forms, but values, and the project must always adhere to reality: architecture is a realist art. “Not only does modernity not contradict tradition, it is the most evolved instance of tradition. In any case, we must have the courage to engrave the sign of our times and the more modern we can be, the better we will be connected with tradition and our works will harmonize with environmental pre-existences”. “The concept of continuity implies that of a mutation in the order of a tradition.” (Rogers, 1958).

With this commitment toward modernity and this idea of continuity, the central theme of the Milanese reconstruction was also addressed by others, namely, the city blocks – or fragments thereof – included in the ancient fabric, parts of the city still recognizable in their morphology, in urban relationships with the streets and communal spaces, in the articulation of the inner courtyards that characterized the housing of the old town.

Here the comparison between new and ancient architecture was direct, putting the meaning of continuity to the test and deepening reflection on the principles behind building the city.

The best projects and experiments travel the uncertain road of integration with the extant and the context, with the environmental pre-existences, in a way however that does not preclude new relationships between the urban elements, between housing and streets, constructed and open spaces, private buildings and collective spaces, also within the existing fabric. They seek to understand the rules that underlie the construction of the buildings and places of the ancient city to define modern principles that will dialogue with and enrich it. They seek the path of renewal through knowledge of places and their history, through a modernization aware of tradition. They seek, in short, a relationship of continuity with the existing city without ceasing to question its rules, in the name of a modernity seen as a correspondence of the forms of the architecture to their own time and to the city’s need for growth.

A characteristic common to the best projects is the non-acceptance of the closed city block. The request for an increase in density, common to all interventions, led to an attempt to have two opposing kinds of
logic coexist in the same project: the affirmation of the continuity of a curtain wall frontage via low buildings or bases that take their measure from the pre-existing constructions, possibly open toward the interior green spaces that now showed themselves to the city, and the highest buildings, inside lots or arranged at right angles to the street, that refuted the latter as an element of relationship, looking inwards toward a place that was more peaceful, quiet, and possibly green.

Among the best examples of this research, focused in the span of a few years, are several projects by Piero Bottoni, including the house in Corso Buenos Aires (1946-1951); the house in Via Broletto by Figini and Pollini (1947-1948), the beautiful house in Via Lanzone by Asnago and Vender (1950-1953), and the complex in Corso Italia by Luigi Moretti (1949-1956), a Roman architect who had moved to Milan.

These choices partially reflected the position of the pre-war period toward projects for the construction of large new suburbs of urban expansion, the other grand, urgent theme that the Milanese architectural culture had to simultaneously tackle to provide accommodation to the thousands of immigrants from the south of Italy in search of work. This condition made it even more imperative to find a response to the theme of housing estates and a redefinition of the construction principles of the city as a whole.

The leading light of this research into neighborhoods was still the group of architects who represented the Rationalist soul of Italian architecture: teachers and students belonging to two or three generations, once again Piero Bottoni, Luigi Figini and Gino Pollini, the BBPR, Ignazio Gardella, and Franco Albini, to name but a few. They studied plans for the city, for Milan, for Ivrea for the Aosta Valley, and drew up the plans for the first housing estates of the ‘30s and ‘40s, ending, after the schism of the war, in the quite different and extraordinary experiences of the QT8, Harar and Feltre neighborhoods.

In common with the research of northern Europe, there would still be a negation of the 19th-century ways of constructing a city, founded on the relationship between the street and the city block, but the three estates also represented an attempt to overcome the simplification and uniformity of “satellite neighborhoods” that had characterized their own projects prior to the war. In fact, there is a distinct difference between the first projects for self-sufficient neighborhoods (the project for Milano Verde of Albini, Gardella, Minoletti, Pagano, Palanti, Predeval, Romano, 1938, the “Horizontal City” of Pagano, Diotallevi, and Marescotti, 1937-42, the four satellite towns developed by Albini, Bottoni, Camus, Cerutti, Fabbri, C. and M. Mazzocchi, Minoletti, Palanti, Pucci, and Putelli, 1939-40, among the most important), and the latest social housing schemes of the INA House season, the national plan for the construction of social housing that allowed experimentation on these issues in many parts of Italy, between the famous and exemplary project for Milano Verde, which adopted the orthodox rules of the Modern Movement, and the Feltre neighbourhood, the last in order of time, and the fruit of the same culture and the same group of architects. What was the radical change of the latter neighborhoods due to?

The projects were enriched with all the themes developed by the architectural culture, research which had different inflections but common objectives that shared renewed interest in the study of places, a different
attention to history and construction tradition, a rediscovery also of rural architecture and less reflection on settlement principles and composition. These were the major chapters of concerted research that led to a greater clarity of purpose and a greater realism, to a deeper relationship with the reasoning behind a project, with the places and their history, to a greater theoretical depth that helped them overcome a certain abstract formalism.

After a pause of only a few years, the QT8, Harar and Feltre neighborhoods represented the criticism and the surpassing of the previous projects by the same authors. And despite the diversity of the compositional principles they contain, these three projects possess common elements that referred to a different idea of the city.

In the first place, there was criticism of the idea of self-sufficiency which, by accepting the existence of a unique city center, did not call into question the fundamental cause that had led to the formation of the suburbs, becoming a principle of exclusion and paradoxically sanctioning the separateness of the neighborhoods. The location of the three estates sought a relationship with the road network infrastructure and with urban furniture to endorse their belonging to the city, a city that was more sprawling, territorial, no longer monocentric. For this reason, they proposed the realization inside the estates of collective places and buildings of an urban scale and value. In addition, the houses needed to establish a relationship with the civic, public places, and there had to be centers that represented the identity of the estates, as in every historical city. Defined according to differing principles in the three examples, these places reinterpreted public squares, which were always green spaces, like those overlooked by the houses, an indispensable conquest of modern architecture, which now sought to elucidate its identity and measures.

With regard to the question of the construction principles of the city and its growth models, shortly before the end of the war a group of Rationalist architects devised a plan for Milan, the so-called “AR Plan,” a point of reference for subsequent reflection. In the schematic design of the plan, there was provision for a second center for the city, capable, according to its authors, of dismantling the monocentrism, a new pole of activities that would be called “Centro Direzionale” – a business district. This plan paved the way for subsequent studies on the polycentric city as a model to maintain: a city of a territorial scale, supported in its extension by a system of road and rail infrastructures, constituted by multiple interconnected centers. It helped to cope with structural imbalances between a city rich in quality, services and collective places, and increasingly extensive, uniformly residential suburbs; and those between the built city, which inexorably advanced, and a countryside considered a land of conquest – and speculation – driven further and further away.

The proposed model opposed the city’s recent growth patterns. On closer inspection, if the roots in the history of the Lombard territory, and partially those of Italy, were recognized when, from the age of the communes up to the Renaissance, the true wealth of this region had been represented by a perfect balance between city and countryside, by widespread distribution of cities and towns, market centers for the produce of the fertile countryside around them and urban artisan production. A model, with a changed scale and the means for overcoming
distances, to be pursued (and as yet unfulfilled).

The theme of the city was addressed, at least theoretically, by looking at it not only from the center but also from the suburbs: this was a city to try out large-scale interventions, of great extension, where the urban quality was tied to the construction of new centers, new housing estates, theatrical systems, education systems, business centers, new collective places on a territorial scale that could build outposts to counteract the tendency toward the formation of suburbs. A city which, it was theorized, must be designed by parts. Many were the competitions held in those years in various places on these issues and in particular on the business centers, that began from these assumptions. Unfortunately, as often happens in Italy, this great mountain of studies would only remain on paper and in the ideas.

The themes of the city and urban planning were at the center of Giuseppe Samonà’s thinking, the Venetian side of this road of refoundation and undisputed master at reorganizing the University Institute, where, from the ’50s and ’60s, Saverio Muratori, Franco Albini, Ignazio Gardella, and later Carlo Aymonino, Gianugo Polesello, Luciano Semerani, and Aldo Rossi – exiled by the Faculty of Milan had taught.

Samonà was the paladin of the Urban Planning and Architecture unit (G. Samonà L'unità architettura-urbanistica. Scritti e progetti: 1929-1973, edited by Pasquale Lovero, Milan, Franco Angeli, 1978). He supported the idea of a city that was large, territorial, and made up, as Venice masterfully taught, of empty spaces, which must take on a form. A city, as Italo Calvino has Marco Polo say in Invisible Cities, of “instants separated by intervals,” voids necessary to the solids so that these can be distinguished and identified. A city of parts, theorized Aldo Rossi at the end of the ’60s: a city as a manufactured article made up of works of architecture, where the form of the architecture is also the form of the places, or where the places take their form from the works of architecture, conscious of its history, its continuity, and its new problems.

Tying back together the threads of research, Italian architectural culture continued its analytical and theoretical studies along different roads, approaching the central issue. The theme of continuity was studied in depth: is it possible to define with a certain degree of scientific merit this element of permanence, the profoundest heart of architecture handed down by history?

It was above all Rogers’ students who picked up this gauntlet, together with the cultural heritage, and undertook to delve deeper into these themes, each following different roads but with characteristics of cohesion such as to build a School. The problems and tools were all brought into play, tried out in projects applied to different cities, with set objectives of generality and transmissibility, an awareness of the need for a theory that oriented knowledge and what needed to be done, guiding the project.

Around the 1960s, these studies were aimed at the search for a tool that corresponded to the element of continuity and permanence: a scientific tool, analytical and disciplinary, that enabled them to know the extant works of architecture, to identify their original nucleus, the irreducible and permanent element linked to their deepest meaning.
A tool to investigate the spatial character of the buildings and establish the relationship between meaning and spatial organization. The type was a bridge launched between the idea and its implementation, between a thought and its architectural transfiguration. An analytical tool but also, and especially, a design tool that allowed the opposite operation, the organization of a spatial structure that corresponded to the significance of the buildings. A tool developed not to distinguish the works of architecture individually from one another, but to define their common identity, in order to ensure generality so as to recognize themselves and the places of life, to recognize “a house that might resemble my humanity” (Ernesto Nathan Rogers). For many, this was a tool that allowed them to bring form, or rather a formal structure, to a value, an idea, allowed them to convert the essence of a thing into the substance of the form.

The research into the typological character of the buildings and their relationship with the urban morphology indicated the aspiration to define scientific tools to study the city.

The road was opened by Saverio Muratori during his spell of teaching in Venice – in conflict with the Roman school he came from – with a survey of the city’s buildings and the publication of Studi per una operante storia urbana di Venezia (“Studies for an operating urban history of Venice”), in 1960. It was resumed energetically by Carlo Aymonino and Aldo Rossi through surveys and analyses of many cities – Padua, Milan, Pavia, and many others – in addition to theoretical writings with their double signature, Analisi dei rapporti fra tipologia edilizia e morfologia urbana (1964), The Architecture of the City (1966), by Aldo Rossi and Origine e sviluppo della città moderna (1971) by Carlo Aymonino.

The long chapter of studies on the relationship between construction typology and urban morphology, the affirmation of the indestructible bond between architecture and the city – variable though it is in its forms – between the form of architecture and the form of places, the necessity to build each work of architecture upon a study of urban facts, to put the city and its construction as indispensable horizons of sense of each work of architecture was the theme of greatest affinity, consolidated and resistant, of the research of the Milan and Venice schools. The indestructible bond between architecture and place, the reflection on urban facts and their endurance, and the possibility of designing a transformation through architecture were the most fruitful contribution in this period which would be broken up in line with different meanings, shifting the focus onto the aspects of permanence, the structure of space, functional invariants and the recurrence of functions, and the link between a conceptual nucleus and geometry.

How to help these studies to reconstruct and build architecture and cities? What were the value and impact of all this research?

In this evaluation Italy is, as always, divided. There are, I believe, various interpretations. One that is more mechanistic and prescriptive, ascribed to the school of Muratori and his students, from Gianfranco Caniggia to Paolo Maretto onwards – by then back in Rome – that tended to want to confirm the rules and principles recognized in urban analysis in the project, until tempted by the roads of Neorealism and the vernacular. There were, of course, some who opposed the use and questioned the
cognitive value, but above all every possible application as a project tool. Then there was a school, that of Milan-Venice, with which I can identify, which considered typological and morphological analysis a cognitive scientific tool, an indispensable witness of continuity and a starting point of the project, which allowed generalities but also the possibility of surpassing, transgressing and renewing forms. A Rogers-style position of continuity, which opposed that of Muratori, arguing that even the conservation project is, to all intents and purposes, an architectural design, a creative act, simultaneously new and modern, since it is made for a new and different reality.

This story has no conclusion. The arguments are still open and hotly debated, and the positions, as you might imagine, are many and discordant between different schools.

Unfortunately, in Italy, what has always been missing is the possibility to verify these positions through the realization of the many projects carried out over the years. Many competitions focused on these themes. The most interesting responses were directed toward affirming the indivisibility of architecture and cities, a way of thinking about architecture as a formidable tool to construct places, rather than autonomous objects to be set down indifferently in places. Which considered the definition of places the raison d’être and purpose of the architectural project, the project a commitment to knowledge and a civil liability, the composition a tool for the transformation of space and its figuration.

The interest in the urban project, due to the need to define the settlement principles for the new centers and residential areas, whether of expansion or replacement, is a theme that is still present and pressing today in Italy, where the problems of reconstruction now concern the great abandoned areas inside cities – industrial estates, rail yards, barracks – and in some regions, the devastations of earthquakes.
The end of WWII in Italy witnessed a long hoped for and difficult political change, from Mussolini’s dictatorship to a fragile democracy, whose issues inevitably intersected with those of architecture. Fascism acted for two decades as a contradictory factor of development, mixing Roman imperial rhetoric with the myth of youth, reactionary social politics with radical urban transformations, and rural tradition and industrialization. In Marshall Berman’s terms, it pursued modernization (of technology, infrastructures, communication…) by getting rid of modernity (as liberation of individuals from the constraints of family, religion, gender…), with some awkward consequences. The huge gaps created by the wartime destruction in Italian cities came after other – sometimes deeper – wounds inflicted by the fascist regime on their historic urban fabrics, more than often transformed without any reference to the previous situations.

The demolitions of the Borgo’s spine in Rome, or Piazza della Vittoria in Brescia, and many others already treated the very city centers as modernist tabulae rasae. Radical interventions, such as the reconstruction of Rotterdam or Le Havre, were therefore less conceivable in the Italian situation after the war, not only because of a more fragmented power and difficult financing, but also because of the need for a different representation of the social bodies involved in the reconstruction.

This need, in turn, affected the architectural languages. Unlike Nazi Germany, which operated a clear aesthetic choice condemning modernism as a ‘degenerate art,’ Italy pursued a more eclectic architectural policy, connecting to its ideology the approaches of the few designers – such as Libera, Moretti, Pagano, Terragni, Vaccaro – who were able to get in tune with the most advanced expressions of the time. The anti-fascist Italy that emerged from the war asked for a different representation. Therefore, besides the many difficulties Italian architects had to tackle in reconstructing their cities, they also had to cope with a serious reconsideration of the tools of their own discipline in order to overcome methods and outcomes associated with Mussolini’s rule. The tricky layering of both the need for continuity (with history, of the urban fabric, of the communities involved…) and discontinuity (from the political choices that precipitated Italy into a bloody conflict and from everything that brought them to mind) became central in the architectural reflection about reconstruction: an endeavor that went far beyond the sheer recovery of the war destructions. The exposure to these latter issues and to what they represented changed the attitude of Italian architects, and led them to anticipate a critical approach toward the Modern Movement, questioning local identities and the relationship with those contextual constraints that Ernesto Nathan Rogers will define as ‘environmental pre-existences.’

This paper will explore some of the ambiguities the issue of continuity proposed to the architectural reflection in the aftermath of WWII. It was a time of huge transformations, which conditioned the following debate until the 1960s and beyond, in Italy and in a wider context. Its main theoretical questions will be unfolded through a comparison of some examples, mainly from the city of Turin, which, notwithstanding the fact that the confrontation between Rome and Milan had led the national debate, offers an interesting case study of its reception in the peninsula.
In the editorial that opens Domus 205 – the first issue after a one-year hiatus at the end of WWII – Ernesto Nathan Rogers almost apologizes for publishing a magazine instead of hurrying up “with some bricks, or beams, or sheets of glass” to recover the many wrecked buildings of Italian cities.[1] In that January 1946, the situation was still very hard, with the destruction of cities, infrastructures, factories, and especially housing for the people, which already suffered a serious shortage before the conflict. Rogers’ argument – “No problem is solved as long as it does not simultaneously comply with usefulness, morals and aesthetics”[2] – sounds pretty traditional. He quotes almost literally two concepts of Vitruvius’ triad, utilitas (commodity) and venustas (delight), but substitutes the only one tied to building, firmitas (firmness), with ethics. It is a rather surprising choice, given the urgent need for reconstruction, which provides an interesting clue about the issues at stake in that particular moment and how they have been then developed, also under the influence of his profoundly humanist attitude.

Claiming morality in a country that experienced foreign occupation and a harsh civil war, and was trying to build up democracy after a 20-year dictatorship meant calling for a ‘political’ role of architectural design, in which reconstructing Italy’s physical body would go along with reconstructing its society. Architects aspired – at least according to their theoretical leaders – to extract from the fragmented identity of a nation mauled by such hard times and events a shared, unifying expression: rebuilding urban space aimed therefore to shape an emerging, collective subject while portraying it. In order to do this, it was necessary to come to grips with fascism, the ideology that forced Italy into a catastrophic war after having ruled it for 20 years. This was not a simple task for a profession intrinsically compromised with power, whose protagonists, Rogers included, worked under the fascist regime. Furthermore, fascism acted under the pressure of opposite currents and visions as a contradictory factor of development, mixing Roman imperial rhetoric with the myth of youth, reactionary social politics with radical urban transformations, and rural tradition with industrialization. In Marshall Berman’s terms, it pursued modernization (of production, infrastructures, communication...), while getting rid of modernity (as liberation of individuals from the constraints of family, religion, gender...)[3]. Many disciplinary and personal certainties shaped in this totalitarian environment had therefore to undergo a deep revision, in order to redesign the architects’ social role and to provide them with a different toolbox.

What came out, in brief, was an opposite and still contradictory quest for modernity without modernization. The intent to get in tune ‘democratically’ with previously neglected social classes and groups came along with a Neorealist[4] refusal of technological progress, which partly explains the problematic attitude local architects developed toward the Modern Movement after the war. Modernist dehumanizing obsession for performance, they felt, was a decisive factor in driving the world to the catastrophe, and the architecture it produced an unwelcome reminder of the facts they wanted to get past. Unlike Nazi Germany – which, condemning modernism as a degenerate art, unwittingly preserved its agency for further uses – Italy followed a less consistent architectural policy, ending up also by associating with the totalitarian regime the work of those designers – such as Libera, Moretti, Pagano, Terragni, Vaccaro, even Piacentini – who aimed to import to Italy the most advanced researches. Their transla-
tion of modernism into a monumental, classical-Mediterranean, national language of stone, able to celebrate Mussolini’s power, ceased of course to be a viable option, in aesthetic and rhetoric terms. Operations like the ones orchestrated by Marcello Piacentini in the 1930s became examples in reverse at different scales and from many points of view, starting with the relationship with history and local identities. These urban interventions – for example those of Piazza della Vittoria in Brescia or the Borgo’ spine in Rome – repeatedly inflicted deep wounds on historic urban fabrics, usually transformed without any reference to the previous situations. The gaps they opened up in many Italian cities came before and were often bigger than wartime destructions, making it difficult for radical interventions, such as the reconstruction of Rotterdam or Le Havre, to be conceived and realized. In other words, for post-war Italian architects the modernist tabula rasa became a less sustainable choice, at the bigger scale of the whole city as well as for selected urban spaces or buildings.

More than any architectural ideology, however, the common will to rapidly forget the war played a central role in driving our historical centers toward a prevailing com’era dov’era recovery. This Italian formula – coined for the rebuilding of St. Mark’s Campanile in Venice ‘as it was and where it was’ – would recall faithful reconstructions, as in anastylosis, but, like its first example, the reality displayed rougher technical solutions and other modifications. Speeding up works and saving money at the expense of historical correctness and precision were in fact the main goals, implemented through the decision to bind financing “for both public and private buildings […] to the restoration of the pre-war state: any improvement works or variations of any kind with increased costs would not have been compensated.”

This ‘conservative’ approach made sense, on the one hand, for evident practical reasons: to tackle private speculation (avoiding to finance it with public money), facilitate procedures (which new projects would have inevitably slowed down), limit spending (reusing what was left standing and all recoverable materials), employ the abundant workforce available (rebuilding political consent along with public space and the national economy), and to deal with the shortage of materials, the fragmentation of the construction businesses and their technical capability. On the other hand, the great opportunity to get better performance, transforming a deeply damaged building stock, was often lost and with it the occasion for Italian architecture to experiment and advance.

This vast operation, run under the supervision of Genio Civile (State engineering administration), didn’t trigger many disciplinary reactions, also because it was intended as merely technical, almost automatic: historical values, architectural quality or ‘political correctness’ were not the most urgent questions. The case of Turin offers in this regard some interesting examples. This industrial city, with major military targets, faced significant destruction and dealt with a large range of interventions in the post-war recovery. Though less central in respect of the national debate – traditionally based on the confrontation between Rome and Milan – Turin represents a case study able to highlight its reception and real fallout. Part of its own Piacentinian piece, Via Roma, underwent for instance serious damages, but it was reconstructed without much ado, demonstrating that a pragmatic attitude toward recovery would furthermore overcome potentially divisive operations. This also worked in the rare cases when some available money made it possible new additions or substitutions.
The Palazzo della Moda (Fashion Palace, 1938), though a recent and consistent example of Rationalist architecture designed by Ettore Sottsass Sr., underwent various extensions and transformations, starting with the vault built by Pier Luigi Nervi in 1948.

Just a couple of monumental situations sparked off a national debate around their future destiny: Monte Cassino Abbey, almost completely wiped out by the Allied Army, and especially the Nazi destruction in the center of Florence, namely the Santa Trinita bridge and the houses that gave access to Ponte Vecchio. As always in these cases, three main options were at stake: faithful reconstruction, total substitution, or contemporary solutions integrating the ruins. This latter, which entails the intention to preserve the memory of painful events and usually responds better to the architectural ethical need of being ‘true,’ has never had great possibilities in Italy, where the people’s wish to forget always prevailed. Therefore, the abbey and the bridge were accurately rebuilt, while the houses on Por Santa Maria Street underwent a timid redesign. Both came along with many polemics, mainly gathered around the issue of ‘authenticity.’

For the purpose of this paper, it is sufficient to remember that, in the long run, the ‘fake’ bridge and abbey disturbed the architectural sensibility less than the ‘sincere’ buildings designed from scratch, whose search for a ‘Florentine’ feeling still sounds phoney and weak. Those houses near Ponte Vecchio certainly do not stand out for their design quality, which is more affected than enhanced by the morphological and contextual concern. But it is precisely this intent to set the new intervention within the pre-existing environment, later theorized by Ernesto Rogers,[8] that marked Italian architecture, for better or worse, in the 15 years of the reconstruction and beyond.

Rogers’ Torre Velasca in Milan (1954-58) represents the symbol of this approach. It is a curious skyscraper that turns structural expression – the typical exposed concrete framework of those years – into a sort of medieval remembrance. Gino Valle, comparing it to his Torre Vriz in Trieste (1950-57), mocked the Velasca as an “elephant in disguise” because of its odd mix of historical mimicry and contemporary dimensions.[9] But Valle, who completed his education at Harvard, belonged to a generation of architects who had graduated after the war. He had no need to apologize for placing his research into international trends and was able to employ simpler design tactics. While Valle’s brutalist slab is set back from the street, lowering its impact from closer views, BPR’s high-rises (also the one built in Turin in 1959) look for a complicated contextual fitting.

Among the many historical examples Italian cities offered to Rogers and Co., the Middle Ages made some ‘progressive’ sense. Citizenship, basic freedom and cooperation first thrived in the age of communes, and quoting that period allowed for a very different symbolic reference and image compared to the ‘imperial’ classicism that supported fascist ideology. Insisted axial symmetries and serial repetitions gave way to fragmentation and marginal differentiation, hierarchical orders and stone cladding to the decorative use of constructive solutions that, by the way, kept a meaningful connection with the Modern Movement’s early sources of inspiration. Rogers, after all, was still a member of the CIAM and his attempt to recover past styles, sublimating them in a dryer version with current materials and techniques, reveals a contradictory desire to be both against and within the modern-

ist camp. He did and wanted to share the collective inclination to forget the last dramatic 30 years (the two World Wars and what came in-between were perceived as a connected chain of events) but without completely believing in the possibility of restarting architecture from past times.

A radical step in that direction takes us again to Turin and to the work of younger architects, who had no personal biographies to overwrite. Roberto Gabetti and Aimaro Isola experimented in a plot cleared by bombing under the Mole Antonelliana with a refined revival of Art Nouveau atmospheres and detailing, inaugurating the ‘Neo-Liberty’ season. Their Bottega d’Erasmo (1953-56), published by Rogers in Casabella-continuità,[10] became a sensation precisely because of its ease in overlooking modernist orthodoxy. Paradoxically, they declared an intention completely disconnected from history with “no particular attitudes towards the past or the future” in order to “live in the present as isolated occasion.”[11] Therefore, they didn’t feel that the Neo-Liberty definition could grasp their approach, even though it frames precisely that form of novelty through nostalgia that their architecture often delivers and which became a sort of trademark of post-war Italy.

The problematic relationship with modernist ways to interpret and transform reality that was precipitating new-old solutions in Italian city centers affected the debate around the urban extensions. The architects’ interest, however, shifted from probing cultivated historical references to a more sociological level. Those who still trusted in up-to-date technologies and promoted prefabrication and standardization – mostly Milanese, like Piero Bottoni, author of the QT8 neighborhood in Milan – soon faced a defeat. The idea to cope with housing shortage leaning on construction research, in order to reduce costs and get advanced architectural outcomes, gave way to an almost opposite quest for identity and differentiation.[12] Architects questioned their disciplinary habits to get in tune with the supposed immaterial needs and desires of the people, mostly refugees from Istria and Dalmatia and former rural workers and their families, who came to the town to make a living in the new economic conditions. The vernacular languages that characterize the Italian peripheries of this period – meant to remember the spaces the new inhabitants were coming from and reduce their bewilderment – thrived again thanks to political-economic decisions. The so-called ‘Fanfani Plan’ or INA-Casa, which promoted the public intervention in social housing from 1949 to 1963, was literally a bundle of Provisions to Increase Worker Employment, Facilitating the Construction of Workers’ Homes.[13] In other words, it was a Keynesian measure to improve the economy through public spending, which produced houses as a side effect. The budget for these interventions was accordingly more generous than the cheaper construction costs made possible by industrialization. Traditional, highly labor-intensive techniques, accessible also to a non-specialized workforce (designers included, in a way) were welcome and allowed for a consistent meeting of architectural nostalgia with a backward production environment.

The most famous of these housing projects is probably the Tiburtino (Rome, 1950-54), but an example from Turin, the Falchera (1951-54), presents some similar themes and solution – even though with a less ‘baroque’ approach[14] – and can resume the architectural outcome of the vast INA-Casa plan (355,000 housing units built in 14 years in the whole country). Apart from the typological variations, which

[13] This is the title of the law approved by the Italian Parliament (n. 43, 28 February 1949). Firstly aimed to last for seven years, it was extended for another seven until 1953.
add complexity in the Roman neighborhood, Falchera shares with it the intention to overcome the bewildering uniformity of modernist geometries. The search for an insisted differentiation between both the in-between spaces and the objects that define them aimed to get individual recognizable situations that people could feel were their own. The 'seismic' vibration of the Tiburtino resulted in another 'catastrophic' site plan in Turin, where housing is scattered, in the words of Carlo Mollino, like "a derailed train" and forms various irregular courtyards. Also here, materials, building solutions and details – terracotta pitched roofs, exposed brickwork, wood shutters – evoke those of the rural tradition and have been used by the different architects who designed its single buildings.

These public interventions usually took place on cheap, open land, far outside the city limits, and were provided with some necessary facilities. When the city expansion incorporated them, as soon happened for the Tiburtino, the initial physical isolation and functional autonomy often turned into a form of social exclusion, highlighted by morphological weirdness. Those post-war public interventions failed, in other words, to become a viable model for current practices, following the destiny of the modernist examples they criticized. Of course, this outcome has manifold reasons, further motivated by the complicated Italian situation in terms of culture, economy, and decision-making. However, just to limit our gaze to the disciplinary plane, behind the deep formal difference, it emerges as a striking typological and quantitative continuity between modernist models and their post-war declinations, which consist in manipulations of previous achievements more than completely new experiments. Relatively low density (lower than the one exploited by free market operations), relationship with greenery, aggregation of dwellings and their arrangement and distribution do not show substantial differences after WWII, with some compelling analogy between Italian plans and those worked out by Alexander Klein in his functionalist and performative research on the Existenzminimum.

The ethical position advocated by Ernesto Rogers translated, as happens often in architecture, into an aesthetic endeavor. Browsing that first post-war issue of Domus, this is a result clearly anticipated by the "body language" of the journal. Articles and projects are in fact intermingled with almost as many pages of advertisement, which made its publication possible. This unwitting manifestation of the reality principle – coming from an emerging economy and culture – is marginally dedicated to those so necessary "bricks, beams and sheets of glass:" more than half of the ads were about voluptuary goods, wine, liqueurs, smoking items, clothes, perfumes, and, especially, cosmetics. Differently from the editor-in-chief’s Platonic approach, they speak of a powerful dimension of desire and show more confidence in the technological promise of a better future. Shifting architectural self-awareness from the material-constructive component to a moral-political one provided room, in those difficult times, for aesthetic expression, but ended up turning it backward. Besides some positive consequences (INA-Casa neighborhoods met usually better acceptance than more ‘rational’ social housing interventions beyond the Alps), this approach oriented Italian architecture toward language researches that, virtually detached from the realities of its production, weakened its abilities to interpret and transform them.
The demolition of the capital city of Poland during World War II was a unique act of the systematic annihilation of a city and its historical roots. The so-called Office for the Rebuilding of the Capital City managed to reconstruct not just the monuments, which were crucial for the city landscape, but entire streets and city structures, including the historical city center. The restored Warsaw Old Town subsequently became a national monument of Polish heroism, listed in 1980 by UNESCO as a World Heritage Site.

The rebuilt Warsaw Old Town is usually seen as an example of the most faithful, comprehensive, and complete reconstruction in the history of architecture. However, its restoration was not just a reproduction of the pre-war urban fabric, but a combination of a romantic vision of history, on the one hand, and 20th-century pragmatism, on the other. By demolishing particular buildings and rebuilding others, political and planning authorities sought to rewrite the history of the city. At the same time, they saw the complete destruction of the city as an opportunity to modernize its architecture and to finally upgrade the poor living conditions in the Warsaw apartments to meet 20th-century hygiene standards.

While looking for the source of inspiration for the reconstruction of Warsaw monuments, one can see a clear continuation of the pre-war urban planning and architecture, which is especially visible in the early years of Warsaw’s reconstruction. The urban renewal program introduced in the Warsaw Old Town shows also some similarities with the projects carried out in the 1930s in Germany, Switzerland and Italy. Polish architects, as well as conservationists, had been intensively working on urban renewal and restoration projects for the city since the 1930s and had continued their work during the war. For political reasons, they rarely mentioned their pre-war activities after 1945. Admitting that they could work on their projects in wartime was taboo, as it could have been perceived as collaboration with the enemy.

My presentation will showcase some of the research findings from my doctoral dissertation, in which I argue that the manner in which Warsaw’s monuments were reconstructed in fact evinced a unique mixture of contrasting tendencies. The attempt to somehow recover the shape of the city from the time before industrialization in the second half of the 19th century, recalling the vaunted epoch of Polish economic and political prosperity, coexisted with socialist aesthetic doctrines and new building technologies.
Warsaw should not exist anymore. No other European city was as hard-hit during World War II as Warsaw, whose destruction was mostly not a direct result of war, but the outcome of a systematic campaign to annihilate the city and its architecture. By the end of the war, 65 percent of the city and 84 percent on the left Vistula bank, where the city center is situated, had been demolished. Warsaw's Old Town was almost completely devastated.

Although, as one of the Allies, Poland officially belonged to the victors, politically it lost the war. Under Soviet control after 1945, Poland lost not only its independence, but also half of its territory in the East including two metropolises crucial to Polish culture: Lwów/L'viv and Wilno/Vilnius. The reconstruction of Warsaw was supposed to be a compensation for this loss and a way to divert attention from political issues.

At the end of January 1945, three architects – Jan Zachwatowicz, Lech Niemojewski und Marian Spychalski (Warsaw’s first post-war mayor) – came to Warsaw and decided to reconstruct its monuments in their historical forms. Despite the difficult political situation and dramatic conditions, it was possible to rebuild the city, including its historical center, within 10 years. A decisive role in this process was played by Jan Zachwatowicz, the organizer of the Warsaw Reconstruction Office and Poland’s chief state conservationist, who had already begun his career as an architect before the war. Due to his rhetorical skills and political connections, he managed to integrate the reconstruction program of Warsaw’s monuments into the propaganda program of the socialist party.

My paper showcases some of the main findings of my doctoral dissertation, which concentrates on the reconstruction of the historical city center of Warsaw: the old town, the new town and the so called Royal Route including Krakowskie Przedmieście Street, Nowy Świat Street and Ujazdowskie Avenue, which, together, comprise a coherent structure. Although at first glance some parts of Warsaw’s city center resemble their originals, the architects did not intend an exact reconstruction of pre-war Warsaw. Scholars have shown that these differences stemmed from political ideology; a logical interpretation, since Warsaw was supposed to be rebuilt as the capital of a new socialist state. In fact, as I argue in my dissertation, changes in architecture and urban design had their origin in plans and ideas Polish architects had worked on and discussed in the 1930s.
and 1940s, before and during the war, and even at the beginning of the 20th century.

In discussing continuities in Polish architecture and city planning before and after the war, historians tend to focus on modernist architects, who (like their European colleagues) welcomed wartime destruction as a blessing in disguise. Yet it remains taboo to discuss the fact that conservationists – whose main aim should be the protection of monuments – also perceived destruction as a possibility to introduce improvements. The second chief finding of my dissertation is that the reconstruction campaign that took place in Warsaw after the war, despite its extraordinary character and the socialist political system it was supposed to serve, contained many similarities with West European architectural theory and practice.

I will illustrate the practical implications of the fact that reconstruction of Warsaw began before the war with some examples. Since 1980, Warsaw’s city center has been listed as a UNESCO heritage site and is regarded until today as a synonym for the most faithful, comprehensive and spacious undertaking in the history of architectural reconstructions. Most publications that deal with the reconstruction of the Warsaw old town feature a photo of the market square, which was indeed rebuilt precisely according to its pre-war form. This image has encouraged a perception that reconstruction of the whole historic center was almost perfect. In fact, well before the war the whole market square had been perceived as a national monument, because it was one of the few places in Warsaw to maintain its appearance during Poland’s partition between Prussia, Austria and Russia in the 19th century. Most of Warsaw’s districts developed rapidly under Russian occupation and its condition was criticized by the architects and by the art historians in the interwar period.

Beyond the market square, plenty of changes appeared across the old town, most notably as development was made less dense. Although the street network was preserved, most of the development inside city blocks was not rebuilt and was even demolished after the war. Façades also underwent alterations. Some tenements were adjusted in their height to neighboring buildings. These changes aimed to improve both the living conditions for old town inhabitants and for the architectural aesthetics. Although officially such interventions sought to eliminate 19th-century capitalist development, they were typical for 1930s and 1940s urban renewal programs in Germany, Italy and Switzerland.

Although forgotten in Polish architectural history, the same sort of urban renewal had been plotted in 1938 for the Warsaw historical center by the municipal planning department at the Technical University of Warsaw, where Jan Zachwatowicz was working as an assistant professor. No architect who later reconstructed the old town ever mentioned working on these plans before the war. Although the project was not realized before the war, Jan Zachwatowicz had attempted to overhaul the quarter by demolishing the 19th-century developments in courtyards and replacing them with green spaces while rebuilding a part of a medieval city wall in the Warsaw old town in the late 1930s. Street-facing houses, which often suffered poor living conditions, were to be renovated. Ultimately, Zachwatowicz managed to redevelop one urban block in this way.
The extent of wartime destruction meant this method could be applied on a bigger scale. Conservationists prepared a list of tenements that were not to be rebuilt or were destined to be demolished, even if the legal owners of the properties had survived the war and aimed to rebuild their houses. Having begun reconstruction of the wall in the 1930s, Zachwatowicz planned its full reconstruction after 1945 – an
endeavor that demanded creating free space on both its sides. The same strategy from the old town was introduced in the new town, where an intense 19th-century development led architects to invent the architecture of the tenements while rebuilding it. A redevelopment project for this part of the city had already been prepared in 1936, but could only be realized after the war.

Another interesting example is St. John’s Cathedral, which received a new façade and Gothic revival interior design in the 19th century. Zachwatowicz had already been discussing a new project for the cathedral with the responsible priest during the German occupation, between 1943 and 1944. The cathedral was rebuilt according to his plans in an invented Mazovian style. Although in this case the leading argument was the German character of 19th-century architecture, at that time gothic revival was not appreciated by conservationists for aesthetic reasons.

Plans for Nowy Świat Street, the first street fully rebuilt after the war, also began during the war. Due the fact that Nowy Świat was one of Warsaw’s most destroyed streets in September 1939, plans to renew the whole street were ready a year later. All the details of the 1940 plan were implemented after the war thanks to Jan Zachwatowicz, who was one of the architects working on this project.

Some houses that failed to match the desired vision of the city’s past were demolished after the war. Messalka House in Krakowskie Przed-


Miescie had already been a synonym for bad taste before the war. In a 1920 booklet on heritage conservation published by the ministry of culture and education, a picture of Messalka House illustrated how 19th-century architecture disfigured older quarters.\textsuperscript{12} A picture of the same house appeared in a 1952 book on the history of Warsaw urban development as an example of the bad bourgeois taste of capitalist architecture.\textsuperscript{13} As of 1945, the walls of the front building of the Messalka house burned down, whereas the right and the back wing of the house remained completely intact. The 1945 plan foresaw demolition of the front part of the house. However, right after the war it was re-occupied by its pre-war users, who began a battle with authorities and conservationists to prevent demolition. After the ground floor of the front part of the house was renovated, conservationists put security bars on the windows and doors to keep people away from the building.\textsuperscript{14} The front of the house was eventually torn down and replaced by two smaller buildings that replicated those which had stood on the site in the 18th century. The back wings of the 19th-century tenement remained and are still partially visible from the street.

Although in the history of architecture Warsaw represents the most accurate historical reconstruction after a war, my dissertation shows that the post-war reconstruction of the Warsaw city center did not aim to reproduce pre-war architecture. One reason for this is the fact that the story of the reconstruction of Warsaw’s city center did not begin at the moment of its destruction, but much earlier, as the city became Polish in 1918 after a century of Russian rule. Upon Polish independence after World War I, all traces of this foreign hegemony were supposed to disappear from the Warsaw cityscape. Politicians and architects sought to rewind the historical clock to the last prosperous era in Polish history before partition: the times of Poland’s last king, Stanislaus II August Poniatowski. Both modernization and “polonization” featured in the interwar political program of Warsaw urban planning, which could not be realized due to the difficult political and economic situation of the young Polish Republic.

Paradoxically, plans to renew and restore Warsaw that had been initiated before the war and honed during the war were implement-
ed due to the new political system in 1945. Warsaw did not present an exception in the architectural history. Whereas great urban and architectural projects are usually prepared in democratic political systems, their implementation often takes place under authoritarian regimes, where weakened protections of private property and even its nationalization, concentration of money for great representational projects and undemocratic leaders give architects totally new opportunities.

Those undemocratic tools were eagerly used by the Polish architects, who realized their projects even when they caused the eviction of tenants amid a context of immense urban destruction and housing shortage. Architects were obsessed with finally building the city they had dreamed of: an artificially homogeneous space without 19th-century urbanization, revivalist architecture, capitalist influence, traces of Russian occupation, signs of the poor, or Jews. It was an attempt at aesthetic, economic, political, social, and ethnic purification.

Even though Polish architects often posed as the voice of the nation and sought to reconstruct the Polish character of the city, their work relied upon plenty of European ideas, such as German reform architecture, Heimatstil, protection of landscapes, and modern zoning and hygiene.

After the war, Polish architects were not only interested in the work of their foreign colleagues but, despite the Iron Curtain, had actually remained a part of the community of European architects. Surprisingly, one reason this was possible was the partition of Poland until 1918. Polish architects had studied abroad and in different partition zones (Prussian/German, Russian, Habsburg) and gained knowledge from different schools and universities. Ideas from Germany played an essential role in the creation of the renewal program for Warsaw city center.

Because of the constantly changing political situation, Polish architects were well versed in dealing with different rulers. They knew how to present their projects in a way that suited the reigning political system: first under Russian hegemony, then the German occupation during World War I, followed by the interwar authoritar-
The back wings of the 19th-century tenement remained and are still partially visible from the street.

The post-war reconstructions has also distorted perception of pre-war Warsaw, masking problems like poor living conditions, urban hygiene issues, and the great social gap between the rich and the poor who made up most of the city population. This idealized vision of the pre-war city is still present in the popular culture.

The post-war reconstruction of monuments in Warsaw and other cities like Gdansk or Wroclaw has influenced how historical architecture is perceived in contemporary Poland. Public perceptions accustomed themselves to “accurate” monuments, which should not be old and rotten, as well as the demolition and reconstruction of a monument on another site. This tendency is in obvious conflict with principles of heritage conservation prevalent in Europe since 1900, which focuses on the substance of the object, together with its visible layers over time. These layers determine the value of a monument; they should be protected and made visible. A legacy of the reconstruction campaign after World War II is an ongoing tendency to reconstruct monuments that did not exist for a long period of time, as well as to demolish old architecture and rebuild it as a simulation on the same place again, regardless of its historical substance.

The post-war reconstruction of Warsaw’s historic center its “proper form,” their European colleagues preferred to rebuild their destroyed cities in a modernist way. In fact, the Warsaw reconstruction program had much more in common with reconstruction campaigns after World War I, as architects rebuilt historical architecture while improving the aesthetics of buildings and modernizing urban structures.

While Polish architects and conservationists could finally give Warsaw’s historic center its “proper form,” their European colleagues preferred to rebuild their destroyed cities in a modernist way. In fact, the Warsaw reconstruction program had much more in common with reconstruction campaigns after World War I, as architects rebuilt historical architecture while improving the aesthetics of buildings and modernizing urban structures.

The back wings of the 19th-century tenement remained and are still partially visible from the street.


Figures

1. Market square in the old town, 1945 (Photo: L. Sempoliński)
3. Market square in the old town today (Photo: M. Popiołek-Roßkamp)
5. Market square in the new town, before 1945 (Referat Gabarytow, 5526, Archive of the Mazovian Conservationist)
6. Market square in the new town, today (Photo: M. Popiołek-Roßkamp)
7. Reconstruction and redevelopment project by Jan Zachwatowicz, 1937 (Mat IIIb – 472, Museum of Architecture in Wroclaw)
9. St. John’s Cathedral reconstructed after the war (Photo: M. Popiołek-Roßkamp)
10. Visible back wings of the 19th-century Messalka house, Krakowskie Przedmieście Street (Photo: K. Mordyński)
Processes of the Reconstruction of Polish Cities against the European Background

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ABSTRACT

The study shows the phases of post-Second World War processes of the rebuilding Polish cities. The factor of times seems to be a crucial element in the evaluation, showing the changing attitudes and directions. The vast destruction of Poland during the war and enormous demographic movements as post-war consequences of shifted country borders greatly complicated further actions. The distinct Polish political situation caused major problems in understanding the identity of the cities to be rebuilt, leading to a choice between a historical reconstruction on the one hand, or a rejection of historical context on the other. These choices were strongly affected by the ideologies of Socialist Realism, Modernism, and later Post-Modernism, with its nostalgia for historicism. However the specificity of the processes showed a strong tendency among Polish architects for reconstruction. The scale and the methods of the rebuilding processes varied, which was the case of bigger cities – like Warsaw, Gdańsk, Poznań or Wrocław. In some smaller cities attempts to restore the former market places took place—presently exemplified by Opole, Kazimierz Dolny, Racibórz or Bolków. During the post-war processes multiple mistakes and problems occurred. The difficulties involved the lack of survey materials and a lack of qualified architects and planners. The replacement of the populations of cities became the most crucial matter—a typical condition in so-called Reclaimed Lands. The reconstruction was sometimes loosely conducted, leading to the stylisation of architecture. Other improvements involved reduced density or functional transpositions of the city centres. One instance of material for comparison are cities that have been divided by state borders, such as Görlitz-Zgorzelec or Frankfurt (Oder)-Stubice. The decades that followed the 1980’s brought with them distinct examples of reconstruction, carried out in the form of retroversion – in the cases of Elblag and other cities.

The processes listed by the author involve the clearing of debris and ruins, planning and re-evaluation regarding successive phases of the rebuilding processes. The summarising conclusions involve the evaluation of rebuilding processes based on the issues of: holistic continuation of the process, urban continuity, cultural heritage and “memory places” protection and most of all social engagement. The paper refers to the research conducted in recent years on the “Contemporary conditions of the cities impacted by the Second World War”.

PROCEEDINGS
The process of the reconstruction of Polish cities was immensely complex. Its dynamic in different areas of the country, whose borders were shifted after World War II, differed significantly. The enormous destruction and the country’s political transformations impacted the shaping of its destroyed cities. Contrary to pressure and imposed ideologies, the idea of reconstruction was still present in the threads of rebuilding. Elements of these complexes still under discussion constitute the focus of this study.

1. Destruction

1.1 The scale of the destruction

The subject of the reconstruction was a completely ruined state. Poland’s losses after World War II were multi-planar. It is not possible to determine the entirety of these losses in the face of the sheer vastness of the destruction, as well as the territorial changes that took place. Despite the active participation of Polish forces on all fronts as members of the Allies, Poland had no influence on post-war changes made to its territory. Practically 48 percent of the pre-war territory of the Polish Republic was lost to the USSR, which also constituted a direct effect of the war. In total, Poland was reduced in size by 20 percent. The post-German Reclaimed Lands that Poland received in return were in complete ruin. The problem in evaluating the destruction is a subject that was returned to numerous times, both right after the war and in recent years – when detailed reports on the damage to individual cities were published – for Warsaw in 2004, Łódź in 2006 or Poznań in 2008. “Report on the matter of the losses and wartime damage of Poland in the years 1939-45” of 1947, which was published again in 2007, still remains most expansive collection on this subject. It was also at that time that “Map of wartime property damage” was published for the purpose of drafting the National Plan Study. The document depicted the immense losses in, among other cities, Warsaw, Gdańsk, Kielce, Poznań, Lublin, as well as areas of Subcarpathia, in addition to areas along the Narew and San rivers. The map showed the dramatic situation of the cities in the Reclaimed Lands, the current Opole, Lower Silesian and Lubusz Voivodships, and in the north – those of Szczecin, the West Pomeranian, Pomeranian, Warmian-Masurian and Podlasie Voivodships.

Krzysztof Pawłowski estimated that in Western Pomerania, out of 70 cities, 37 were completely ruined, while 26 were destroyed by 50 to 100 percent. In the Wrocław Voivodship, out of 86 cities, 29 were destroyed in excess of 50 percent. Among the large devastated cities in this area, Wrocław and Szczecin particularly stood out. In total, 177 Polish cities that possessed historical centers before the war had suffered more than 50 percent damage.


[2] Original title “Mapa Zniszczeń Wojennych Nieruchomości Miejskich” (1947). The degree of destruction was assessed by presenting the amount of cubic metres of destroyed buildings in relation to the number of inhabitants of a given city in 1939. The study also took into consideration buildings that were damaged by more than 10 percent. The data was collected without including circulation, military and most industrial property.

The type of damage, classified after the war by the architect of the reconstruction of Warsaw, Jan Zachwatowicz, was also of significance to the later rebuilding effort. According to his assessment, in Poland we could list:

- partially destroyed cities, in which some buildings were burned or destroyed – such as Lublin, Brzeg;
- cities where damage was significant, but caused by the burning away of the interior of buildings whose walls had remained – examples being Poznań, Wrocław, Opole, Olsztyn and Nysa;
- cities that were completely destroyed, in which only remnants of buildings could be seen jutting out of debris – this is how Warsaw, the old-town areas of Gdańsk, Szczecin, Malbork, Chojny, Pyrzyce, Głogów, Strzegom, Koszalin, Kołobrzeg and others looked like after the war.

1.2 Population changes and movements

Apart from the significant damage, the immense demographic changes and losses, which also had an impact on the situation of the country, were a separate problem for Poland. It is estimated that 220 out of every 1,000 persons died in Poland during World War II. This is considered to be the highest ratio among all the countries participating in the war, regardless of whether we accept the estimates from 1947, when it was assumed that Poland had lost 6,028,000 of its citizens,[4] or take into consideration the latest study from 2009 determining the losses at between 5.6-5.8 million. The numbers were verified by attempting to objectively assess German war crimes, and primarily those of the Soviets, although they were still vast.[5] Around 3 million of the victims were Polish Jews. Out of all the victims, around 644,000 died as a result of direct military operations, while the remaining 5,384,000 died due to the terror of the occupying forces.[6]

Post-war Poland witnessed major migrations: 1,400,000 Poles and 200,000 Jews from areas held by the Soviet Union were resettled to Poland. At the same time, 480,000 Ukrainians and 36,000 Belarusians were resettled to the USSR.[7] Internal migration in the years 1951–87 in Poland affected over 2 million people.[8] At the same time, according to Polish estimates, in the years 1945-50 around 3.5-4 million German people were displaced from Polish lands, while after 1980 another 60,000 of so-called late displaced persons left the country.[9] Other data shows that, between 1945-1950, 6.9 million German people either were displaced or escaped from areas of pre-war eastern Germany, with 2.9 million in Czechoslovakia and 1.9 million from other countries suffering the same fate.[10]

2. Conditions of the process

Reconstruction after World War II was accompanied by considerable problems, notably the lack of access to historical archives and iconography, which were essential to setting the conditions for execution. Enormous prisms of debris made it difficult to carry out the surveying of the surviving urban layouts, which were often the only elements making reconstruction possible. Thus, planning processes were delayed as well. The lack of access to archival materials was the norm in the Reclaimed Lands, where a dearth of historical studies constituted one of the fundamental problems, making the recreation of the cit-
ies’ forms impossible. If it were not for the surveying documentation of pre-war buildings in Warsaw prepared by the Polish Architecture Division of the Faculty of Architecture of the Warsaw University of Technology that had been saved from burning ruins, it would have been difficult to even initiate any reconstruction processes. Immense gaps in documentation also applied to Gdańsk.[11]

Another hurdle was the lack of a qualified cadre of architects and urban planners in post-German areas. Few had as much experience associated with the process of the revalorization of larger urban complexes as Jan Zachwatowicz, who was involved in works on the Zamość Fortress.[12] The activity of Kazimierz Wejchert and Hanna Adamczewska-Wejchert, who in 1946, along with a team of young architects, drafted simplified plans for 68 cities of the Olsztyn, Szczecin and Wrocław voivodships as a part of their studies can be considered pioneering in this difficult, post-war period. Their actions coincided with attempts to prevent unplanned urban development after the war – particularly in post-German areas. These designs were used in later planning documents.[13]

One subject often overlooked with regard to the execution of the reconstruction process was the demolition of damaged buildings that could have been rebuilt. Oftentimes more buildings essential to the structure of a city, including historical ones, were demolished than those whose technical condition demanded it. The demolitions, as a part of clearing cities from ruins, also applied to buildings that did not fit well within the historical context of a particular city or its new urban layout. Demolitions largely applied to townhouses from the second half of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, as they were not considered historical and were directly associated with the partitions in Poland. Additional demolitions were often later listed as effects of wartime destruction. Another element that is difficult for us to understand today is the destruction of the details of façades and thus their simplification. Examples of many detrimental actions were documented in Warsaw.[14] In a few Polish cities, a complete “replacement” of buildings surrounding market squares took place, such as in Lwówek Śląski and Nysa, while the renovation of the fronts of townhouses was an alternative solution.[15] This subject still requires documenting in Poland. In territories of the Democratic Republic of Germany, there were cases of demolishing damaged religious buildings, such as in Dresden and Magdeburg. Clearing debris and removing buildings that did not fit with the later conceptual plan of Rotterdam constituted one of the most extreme cases of eliminating the historical elements of a city.

In many damaged cities an almost complete replacement of the population took place as well. In Wrocław, for instance, the process of the displacement of the German population ended in 1947 and those who remained in the city had no influence on its further development. The percentage share of the native Polish population was negligible. Dorota Wolniczek pointed out that most of the newcomers had been people from small towns (41.2 percent) and the countryside (40 percent), resettled from the former Polish Eastern Borderlands. To them, everything had been, as the author wrote, “different, alien—neither familiar nor their property, for it constituted neither a national possession nor a possession amassed by a family’s multigenerational efforts.”[17]
Another problem that influenced the identity of a city was nationalisation in destroyed areas. The process was inevitable in light of the scale of the devastation and applied to the majority of cities that had been significantly affected in particular, such as Warsaw, Le Havre, Rotterdam or Dresden, although it was carried out in different ways\[18\].

These decisions later carried over to the later execution of the reconstruction process – most often performed by the state or in a collective manner, tearing away the still-living residents from their places, and often from centuries-old family history. Former membership and identity were being erased in this manner. The protection of “memorial sites” in cities and adjacent areas, which could also mean the necessity for expropriation, was a separate issue. The more it was postponed, the harder it was to perform.

The reconstruction was a long-term process. In the 1980s, one could still encounter cities, whose centers were empty – such as Elbląg, Głogów or Dresden. Krzysztof Pawłowski reminisced that for the first 40 years after the war the scope of the work was constantly being changed, as were the methods of carrying it out, with the expansion of the research toolset and the wealth of the construction experience. Historical and urban planning studies were of great importance to the results obtained, as was the perfecting of documentation techniques and the cooperation of urban planners with conservation services.\[19\]

3. Spectrum of the reconstruction

The belief in the need for a post-war reconstruction of cities, which was quite widespread in Poland, was a result of the patriotism of Polish architects. The nascent Polish statehood, which had just been reborn in 1918, was chained down once again after 20 years by the totalitarian activity of the Third Reich and the Soviet Union. Poland had found itself in a peculiar situation after World War II, one that was made permanent by the post-war divisions in Europe, in which the interests of one of the most important members of the Allies were not taken into consideration – those of Poland. The destruction of cities, primarily of the capital, sealed Poland’s fate. Warsaw was hit particularly hard, as it had been deliberately demolished by Nazi Germans. Its planned reconstruction was meant to symbolize the rebirth of ‘Polishness’ at its site, counter to the enemy’s prior intentions. Of note are Jan Zachwatowicz’s words, which reflect the manner of post-war thinking. “The feeling of responsibility for future generations demands a conscious reconstruction of those of our possessions that have been destroyed, a full reconstruction, one that is fully aware of its conservatorial falsehood.” He highlighted this patriotism even further: “Not content with monuments of culture being taken from us, we will rebuild them, we will rebuild them from the ground up, in order to show other generations the precise form of these monuments, and if not their authentic one—then the form that lives on in our memory and is accessible in materials.”\[20\] This peculiar attitude toward reconstruction efforts in Poland, burdened by a spirit of patriotic tradition, can be called, after Jacek Purchla, the “reconstructivism syndrome.”\[21\]

This phenomenon was also present in Western Europe, although to a lesser degree. The traditional approach to the process can be found, for instance, in the first post-war years in Germany. Examples of the reconstruction of fragments of downtown buildings can be seen in Münster, as well as in the more stylized forms of Freudenstadt and...
Neubrandenburg. Among the larger cities that had suffered significant destruction and were rebuilt in their pre-war character, one can mention Nurnberg and the center of Munich. Attempts at recreating historical cities under the influence of the so-called ‘Delft Dictatorship,’ associated with Granpré Molière, made themselves evident in the Netherlands. These influences were visible in the reconstruction of smaller cities, like Middleburg or Rhenen.\[22\]

The current of traditional reconstruction found its fullest expression in the rebuilding of Warsaw. Despite complete reconstruction being assumed in this case, the process of recreating the city was impossible, both due to the scale of the damage and the intentional improvement on the original. None of the rebuilt cities copied their original form, not even Warsaw, which, in Zachwatowicz’s vision, was meant to be a total reconstruction, based on preserving the historical plan, scale and property divisions. The previously mentioned care for architectural matter and detail became an equally essential element of faithfulness to the tradition of a place. However, the shape Warsaw was to take was determined by the desire to recreate the city in its ‘perfect,’ 16th- and 17th-century form, with a visible line of historical fortifications. Such efforts, with immense respect to the designers, led to an obvious over-interpretation of the lost city. However, the symbolic value of rebuilt Warsaw is indeed undeniable.

In post-war Poland, many attempts were made to reconstruct urban complexes with architecture referring to history, and the efforts led to the recreation of the historical layout of streets and the atmosphere of the city. The extent of the restoration of the urban layout, the scale of reconstructed areas, as well as the character of architectural solutions were all dependent on a series of factors – ideological, social, economic and others. This is why there were so many differences among the rebuilt cities. The reconstruction of Warsaw’s Old Town was, among the examples of post-World War II reconstructions, a unique project, despite the fact that it was impossible to cover the entire area of the historical city. Two other large cities, Gdańsk and Poznań, took the path to reconstruction as well. In Gdańsk, the reconstruction was focused on the Main Town, with several streets that were parallel to Długa Street being recreated. The reconstruction, by including the trails of the main streets, did not, however, recreate the perpendicular streets – those that closed off urban blocks. It also considerably reduced the density of the interior courtyards. In Poznań, areas of the Old Town were filled in, while the frontages of the market square and its adjacent streets were rebuilt. The town hall, as well as the townhouses and palaces near the market square were reconstructed. The historical market stands, which lacked sufficient documentation, were designed in modern, slightly brutalist forms, signalling a change in established reconstruction trends. Gradually, the scale and level of reconstruction became reduced and limited to the few most important elements of the former downtown areas. Increasingly selective efforts were being undertaken in other cities. In Wrocław, the frontages of the market square, primarily the southern one, as well as Salt Market Square, were rebuilt and filled in. The later phases of the reconstruction did not respect the historical shape of the city. The contrast between the aforementioned Salt Market Square – its character referring to a historical city – and Wrocław’s New Market Square, which had a modernist expression, took on a symbolic dimension.
Despite the difficulties in rebuilding the immense areas of devastation, in some smaller cities attempts were made to reconstruct their past market squares. These efforts limited the scale of the reconstruction in the face of later modernist influence, leading to a loosening of the neighboring built-up areas. Today, however, a reconstructed market square layout, with buildings fitted into frontages, constitutes the most essential place that links a formerly damaged city with its history, often being the only one to do so. In cities in which market squares have been rebuilt, they remain the main center of urban life, just as they had been before the war. Opole’s market square was also rebuilt after the war. As was the market square in Kazimierz Dolny, which had already been destroyed during World War I. In some cities, work on rebuilding market squares continued in modernist forms as well while still preserving frontage lines and façade divisions, even creating contemporary forms of urban arcades. In many cities, only a single frontage or a fragment thereof was restored, as for instance in Racibórz or Bolków. The remaining parts of the envelopes of the squares were filled with modernist buildings, sometimes featuring references to historical ones. In Bolków, it was a contemporary interpretation of the historical arcades of the market square.

The reconstruction of cities took on numerous forms, with the degree of similarity to a historical city being marked in different ways. The city of Ulm in Germany is an example of the reconstruction of a cohesive complex of buildings in the spirit of tradition, with buildings reflecting the 1950s and the 1960s. Buildings in a similar vein, although slightly more simplified, can be found in Neubrandenburg, where an orthogonal grid of streets, referring to the historical original, was repeated inside the ring of fortification buildings. In the 1950s, the center was built up with simple buildings featuring high-pitched roofs, weaving in threads of socialist realist architecture as well. However, the entirety was later disrupted by a later intervention in the form of a tower building, which had probably been intended to function as a landmark. Nevertheless, both cities made attempts to recreate parcellation divisions. In the case of smaller losses, fragments of built-up areas were filled in while maintaining the fronts of streets, like in French Rouen. One of the more interesting examples of the assessment of the possibility of such procedures in terms of filling in street-based built-up areas is Budapest. The excessive simplification in the design of the façades of buildings led to their peculiar monotony.

The authenticity of the architecture in the cities undergoing reconstruction in Poland was a matter of contention during both the process itself and its assessment. In Warsaw, Gdańsk, Poznań, as well as Wrocław or Opole and other cities, attempts were made to create an atmosphere of a historical city. This practically meant a more or less faithful recreation or mimicking of traditional architecture. In light of the growing housing demand, architecture had to undergo simplification as well. In Gdańsk, the scale and character of the buildings were maintained in a historical vein, although this was not authentic. The style of buildings was based on using or copying original preserved fragments and architectural details. One element that was treated with much attention was the form of the attics, referring to the Hanseatic character of the city. In Poznań, some of the authentic 19th and 20th-century buildings were preserved. Sometimes, however, elements of detail dated to the period of the partitions were removed. Infills were adapted to scale, but the architecture was stylized in a modern manner, mak-


[26] The removal of details associated with partitions also occurred in Olsztyn, from: B. Rymaszewski [1986], op. cit.
ing it different from the original structures. The composition of the façades of townhouses that was developed at the time is currently a defining feature of the uniqueness of Poznań’s old town. High-pitched roofs and the proportions of plot divisions were maintained across the entire complex. In Wrocław, apart from reconstruction and infills that were in accord with historical documentation, there appeared loose interpretations, most often in the Baroque or classicist style. High-pitched roofs and similar dimensions were used in the market square, while frontages, particularly the southern one, were filled in. Attempts at stylization in the architecture of the time can now be seen in the frontages of Salt Market Square. In many smaller cities, architecture became a subject of interpretation as well. In Łomża, for instance, the Baroque gables of buildings were built over.

In the Reclaimed Lands, stylistic interpretations were an element of restoring ‘Polishness.’ The search for references to the Polish identity could mean the recreation of architecture from the period during which an area had been a part of the Commonwealth, or a loose interpretation of architecture in the national spirit. In Racibórz, attics were erected on buildings of one of the frontages – attics that had not been there earlier. In Olsztyn, references were made to Renaissance and Baroque architecture from the period when the city was a part of the Commonwealth after the Peace of Thorn, which also created architectural fiction. These actions are unthinkable to us, contemporaries, as they create urban landscapes that are stylized instead of being authentic. Artificially formed architecture that mimics historical buildings led to the depreciation of the value of authentic monuments. Post-war architects were excused by the sheer scale of the destruction and the replacement of the population, as the foundation of the idea of searching for any possible reference to the Polish identity of these areas. Stylized architecture, including references to Polish traditions in particular – one that is difficult to justify in cities that had been redeveloped under German influence for the previous several centuries – became an element of making cities more familiar, transforming them into forms that were closer to their new residents. Every reconstruction was associated with change. Deliberate efforts were made to improve the layout of cities. The previously mentioned straightening out or widening of some streets were some of the more common processes of ‘improving’ cities. City squares were sometimes expanded by including neighboring urban blocks, as was the case in Frombork.

Improving the urban layout while using street-based layouts in densely built-up downtown areas was primarily being carried out by reducing the density of the outer urban blocks – hence, the sanitation of backhouse buildings and the shortening of bays. This happened in the case of cities that replicated historical layouts of streets and squares – Gdańsk, the German Ulm or the outer urban blocks of reconstructed Warsaw. The lowering of the density of urban structures improved housing conditions in downtown areas, introducing light and air into apartments. It simultaneously led to a disadvantageous drop in building density. A complete correction of the layout meant a change of direction from reconstruction to redevelopment. As a part of the later modernist reconstruction, lowering the density of the cities’ structure was clearly observable, for instance, in the perforated structure of Dresden.

Structural changes corresponded with the new programming of downtown areas. Complexes reconstructed in various manners,
Despite attempts to refer to the form of traditional cities, were already built under the influence of new ideas. New programming of downtown areas followed the ideology of modernism that made a breakthrough after the war. This programming affected both reconstructed and redeveloped cities to a similar degree. Modernism brought with it a belief in the necessity to structure the function of the old downtown areas. The historical concept of a mixed-use city was abandoned. This is why downtown districts were being converted into residential ones—in essence an almost universally occurring procedure, particularly in light of the demand for housing. Because of this, downtown areas saw the introduction of daycares and kindergartens. In the reconstructed historical complexes of Warsaw, Poznań and Gdańsk, the additional functions, such as retail, gastronomy and culture, were primarily meant for tourists. These changes were conducive to the shifting of the actual downtown areas outside of historical centers. In Gdańsk, it was only the modernization that started in the middle of the 1970s that broadened the spectrum of the functions of the ground floors to include new, regenerating forms of use.\[^{29}\]

4. The legacy of rebuilding processes

In Eastern European countries, the use of modernist solutions was not permitted up to the end of the Stalinist period. In the sphere of influence of the USSR, socialist realism was imposed as a model of urban and architectural reconstruction. Despite its traditional architectural form, it implanted alien structures, thus becoming a part of the currents of the redevelopment of post-war cities. Socialist realist models took on the form of a peculiar template, an urban-planning alphabet composed of places for manifestations—expansive squares or broad streets—and sometimes symbolic landmarks in the form of palaces of culture, with the entirety being dressed in the trappings of classicist-like architecture. Trips of architects to the Soviet capital were one of the recurrent themes of post-war history. They influenced the spread of influences and architectural fashions. Many common threads that referred to the original Moscow can today be found in the central districts of Kiev, Minsk, Voronezh, Warsaw, East Berlin, Dresden or Magdeburg. Soviet influence was also observable in smaller cities—in Lublin, for instance, a ‘people’s gathering square’ was planned at the border of the Old Town and the former Jewish quarter.\[^{30}\] The model of the socialist city was met with a lack of acceptance for an ideologically and formally alien model. Here, the element of the architects’ search for identity was the use of local detail.

Simultaneously, Europe became a testing ground for the urban planning and architecture of modernism. In Poland, most reconstruction work was completed in the mid-1950s. In the following period, such work was carried out in Gdańsk, Poznań and Warsaw—during the reconstruction of the Royal and Ujazdowski castles, as well as other historical structures.\[^{31}\] It was also in this period that the time of modernist influence began in Poland and other countries of the Eastern Bloc. On our own domestic grounds, the breakthrough date, which was symbolically pointed out by Bogustaw Szymgin, was 1956, when the conceptual design of the redevelopment of Szczecin was first put on display.\[^{32}\] The design assumed reconstruction work on only a select few historical buildings, including the Loitz family townhouse, the town hall, the castle and the city’s religious buildings. The remaining part of the city was to be developed along its former streets, but using loosely placed structures. The disregard for the former setback lines

\[^{29}\] M. Nowakowski (2013), op. cit., 130 refers to a design by W. Peszkowski, N. Sienkiewicz, A. Walczyk and S. Zawiejski.


in the historical center, which were not recreated, caused a complete
departure from the historical city. The destruction was made complete
through expansive circulation projects.\[33\]

Modernism as a method of post-war urban redevelopment led to an
everlasting spatial destruction of Polish cities. Damage was particularly
done to small towns, whose market-square-based layouts could not be
saved. We can point to examples such as Malbork, in which all efforts
were focused on the reconstruction of the Castle of the Teutonic Order
and its few other historical monuments. The Old Town, meanwhile,
was schematically built up using apartment blocks. There were more
similar examples. In Legnica, the Old Town area saw the construction of
11-story apartment blocks. Block buildings were also built in historical
downtown areas of Lublin, Stargard or Lwówek Śląski.\[34\]

Cities that became divided by new borders also found themselves in a
difficult situation. The double cities of Görlitz-Zgorzelec or Frankfurt
on the Oder-Słubice constitute an interesting comparative study of post-
war processes. Görlitz is an example of a city that has survived the
chaos of the war and is a unique complex of authentic architecture
and urban planning. Frankfurt on the Oder is an example of the
redevelopment of a city in the modernist style, with comfortable
solutions of pedestrian and retail spaces. Zgorzelec and Słubice,
both on the Polish side, could not deal with the post-war processes
of reconstruction and redevelopment, which had been carried out
selectively and, unfortunately, chaotically, largely due to the lack of a
crystallized primary structure of the city’s public spaces that had been
created after its division. They became the victims of the lack of urban
reconstruction, both the post-war and the later one of the 1980s.

5. A return to the reconstruction

The return to the reconstruction phase in Poland took place in the
1980s. The year 1980 was a watershed moment for Poland, and not only
due to political changes and the hope for freedom that was brought
about by the registration of the first Independent Self-governed Labour
Union “Solidarity.” Warsaw’s Old Town, rebuilt after the war, was placed
on the UNESCO World Heritage Sites List in the same year. The listing
symbolically acknowledged the reconstruction work in the area of the
former city that had previously been criticized by global public opinion
as going against the precepts of conservation. In a sense, it became an
impulse for architects who thought of architecture and urban planning
in a traditional manner, and there was never a lack of such in Poland.

Postmodernism found fertile ground in Poland, which was, in truth,
conditioned by history. The critical attitude toward the socialist period
of urban reconstruction was also an element of the turn away from
modernism. These phenomena coincided with critical reconstruction
in Germany.
Meanwhile in Poland, there were still empty damaged city centers that were not rebuilt – in Elbląg, Głogów, or in Pasłęka – and which remain in this condition today. Their reconstruction broke away from the dogma of modernism, attempting to restore the value of the historical city. The center of Elbląg, which was completely destroyed in the war, functioned as a green park with a few remaining buildings, such as the Market Gate, for years. The downtown area was subjected to many different approaches, depending on the period – planned as a park, a housing estate composed of apartment blocks or the location of a large shopping center.\[39\] The method of Elbląg’s reconstruction constitutes a model example. The method of retroversion was used here, which had been developed and described by Maria Lubocka-Hoffmann, a long-term Voivodship Conservator of Historical Monuments of Elbląg. The method was based on the protection of the preserved authentic historical buildings and the recreation of the 13th-century city structure. As part of the conceptual plan that was being carried out since the 1980s, the historical outline of the city’s plan,

Retroversion of Stary Rynek street in Elbląg.

Individual townhouses were designed on “old foundations, using traditional dimensions, proportions and façade divisions.” In terms of architecture, “the possibility of reconstruction and historical stylisation, as well as (…) modernist solutions were rejected.”

The contemporary form of even hundreds of townhouses was meant to refer to local tradition. The works were based on the plans of a team led by J. Bocheński, after 1992, taking into consideration the modifications introduced by the team under the supervision of A. Baranowski. The works led to the restoration of the main axis of Stary Rynek street in the public space of the Old Town, which culminates at Market Gate.

The restoration of the role and significance of Elbląg’s city center constituted an undeniable success of the project. Today, the reconstruction is, however, accompanied by voices of criticism, whose important argument is the adopted postmodern architectural aesthetic. To what degree is it a reference to the architecture of the Hanseatic city and to what extent a rather random fantasy? The adoption of concordance with conservation doctrine, in the case of Elbląg, has led to the development of an original concept of the townhouse, and this is something which always leads to a discussion. In a sense, the reconstructed city of Elbląg is a monument of the period and its architecture. As the work continues, however, extend-
ing the deadline is conducive to corrections in the adopted approach. We can also currently encounter retroversion in other Polish cities, like Głogów or Szczecin. The yearning for the atmosphere of a historical city is returning in Germany as well, as in the restitution of Neumarkt in Dresden, or the recreated historical forms in Potsdam.

6. Conclusions

The process of reconstruction was immensely complicated and long-lasting, and has not ended yet for some cities. Considering the expansive destruction, reconstruction became a patchwork process that brought additional, significantly differing concepts into the scope of a structure, as was the case in Warsaw, Berlin, Minsk or Dresden. The fragmentary character of the solutions was also a consequence of not seeing processes to their completion for various reasons, including the changing visions of cities in terms of urban planning.

Processes that were often overlooked, like the excessively eager clearing of cities from debris and ruins, could cause the complete elimination of historical substance from a given city. The demolitions of larger complexes led to the erasure of the cities’ structures. The initial stages should include the delineation of protected areas, including those of cultural heritage, as well as “memorial sites.” The early delineation of the borders of areas aids in preventing future conflicts.

Examples of the reconstruction of smaller Polish cities have shown that the recreation of the buildings around central market squares and the main streets extending from them are an immensely essential element that structures future efforts. The structures, built over entire centuries, created characteristic social ties, typical of a given place and city. Central squares were also simultaneously the centers made by their inhabitants. Repeating the previous scale of the complex and the divisions of the plots constituted an important reference to the historical city. The possibility of getting the community involved in the process, including having the former owners rebuild the parcels, while providing support in terms of design, materials and even construction work, could form an important relationship between a place and its resident. The experiences of modernism currently warn us of excessively correcting cities, both in terms of their morphological layout and their functional program.

Many mistakes could be observed in the reconstruction, mistakes that lead us to formulate conclusions and guidelines. Reconstruction is a multi-stage process, with each stage composed of many different phases, from clearing debris, through planning, construction and successive phases of re-evaluation, and adapting the process to current needs. An immensely essential element in the execution of such projects is constant control of the process and all its elements. Among the basic assumptions in ensuring a successful reconstruction we can list: planning that is understood as a holistic continuation of the process, maintaining urban continuity, preserving cultural heritage and “memory places,” reinforcing references to the urban identity of a place and, as a necessary condition, the social involvement of residents in the process.

The experience of the reconstruction of Polish cities after World War II requires further evaluation. The comparative study chiefly demonstrates that cities where reconstruction were attempted – in a more or less appropriate manner – have created a certain thread of identity between the destroyed city and the one that was rebuilt, thus providing the possibility of continuity.

[38] This is noted in S. Wróblewski (2013), op. cit.


Illustration sources


The siege of Budapest was among the longest and bloodiest of the urban battles of World War II. It lasted a total of 102 days from October 29, 1944 to February 14, 1945 when the city unconditionally surrendered to the Red Army of the Soviet Union. In stark contrast, Berlin was taken in two weeks, Vienna in six days while Paris and most other European capitals – with the exception of Warsaw – never became battlegrounds during the war. The scale of fighting and destruction was comparable only with the sieges of Leningrad, Stalingrad, and Warsaw, namely the most devastating episodes of urban warfare during World War II.

The physical and human toll of the war was enormous. Hardest hit of all were the public representative buildings that encapsulated the city’s history and cultural identity. The Castle District in the Buda Hills overlooking the Danube lay in ruins. Architectural landmarks that defined the Danube skyline were destroyed beyond repair. Yet, the collapsed bridges across the Danube will probably remain the most painful symbol of devastation. All seven bridges were methodically blown up by withdrawing German troops during the siege. The loss of the bridges was also more than just symbolic: they functioned as important arteries of everyday life connecting not only the twin cities of Buda and Pest but the Eastern and Western halves of the country.

Even though the clearing away of debris and rebuilding efforts began immediately after the end of the siege, three years later in 1948 most building activity was still devoted to basic repairs of damaged buildings and infrastructure. The reconstruction of key public buildings was even more protracted: the Buda Castle was completed only in 1966 while the art nouveau Elizabeth Bridge, destroyed in the war, was replaced by a modern suspension bridge in 1964.

Nevertheless, in the eyes of architects and urban planners the havoc wreaked by the war presented a unique opportunity to rectify the urban planning and development mistakes of earlier periods. The few new buildings that began to sprout among the ruins ushered in a short-lived but optimistic era between 1946 and 1949 that carried the promise of a new beginning. Planners and architects passionately debated the need to “build the city anew” as opposed to simply “reconstructing the ruins.” New architectural and urban planning journals, as well as the first post-war architectural and urban planning competitions offered lively forums to these efforts to fundamentally rethink the city.

My paper will focus on the utopian visions that were hatched in these discussions and competitions, and that played a central role in the immediate aftermath of the war before the communist political takeover in 1948 and the coercive introduction of Soviet architectural and planning policies in the early 1950s. First, the paper will show that generating utopian visions in a series of open architectural competitions held immediately after the war in 1945 was, in itself, a significant part of the reconstruction process. Second, it will highlight why and how such utopian blueprints are consequential even if they never materialize, and why unbuilt plans remain an indispensable part of the urban and architectural imagination.
...Tomorrow we’ll breathe life into the ruins with asbestos, iron, and majestic granite,
and out with state decorations! with moonlight! with Orpheums!
We’ll build enormous skyscrapers and the replica of the Eiffel tower to play with.
Bridges with basalt foundations. New myths on the squares made of ringing steel;
and we’ll push screaming, fiery locomotives onto the defunct rails, so they shine and follow their course like dizzying meteorites.
We’ll mix new colors and lay new cables beneath the sea, and we’ll impregnate ripe, single women so the earth can cradle a new species
and the new poets can rejoice, singing the spirit of the new times in Rome, Paris, Moscow, Berlin, London and Budapest. [1]

Lajos Kassák, “Mesteremberek” [Craftsmen], 1914

Lajos Kassák, the author of the poem selected as the epigraph for this paper, was likely the single most important representative of constructivism in Hungary and a firm believer in radical utopian futures. It was after the failed Communist revolution of 1919 in Hungary, while living in exile in Vienna, that he came into contact with various radical avant-garde movements emerging across interwar Europe. Kassák’s own work shows the closest kinship with Activism, the radical left-wing faction of German expressionism, but he was familiar with nearly the full spectrum of avant-garde groupings including Russian constructivism. His poem powerfully encapsulates constructivism’s passionate optimism and faith in social progress driven by technological change and architecture. The journals [Ma, Dokumentum, Munka] Kassák founded and edited played a crucial role in educating the Hungarian art world about these new developments in radical utopian thought. He had particularly strong influence over key Hungarian members and students of the Bauhaus, especially László Moholy-Nagy and the architect Farkas Molnár (Benson and Forgács 2002; Ferkai 2003). Constructivism exerted its influence on Hungarian art and architecture chiefly through the ideas and activities of the Bauhaus, especially in its most radical phase in the 1920s. The legacy of constructivism, which had a strong influence over immediate post-war urban reconstruction plans, is thus intimately tied in Hungary to probing the legacy of the Bauhaus and the universalistic aspirations of interwar modernism.

Hungary and other Central European countries are illuminating in tracing the trajectory of constructivism under socialism because they lay at the crossroads of Eastern and Western influences, being drawn into the political and cultural orbit of the Soviet Union after 1945 while carrying the remnants of Western European intellectual connections from the interwar period (Kulić, Mrduljaš, and Thaler 2012; Zarecor 2011). My analysis shows how these diverse intellectual traditions intersected with local and international political pressures to translate radical utopianism into tangible social reform, particularly through the large-scale transformation of the built environment.

Architecture always held a special status for constructivists, as they firmly believed that painting, sculpture, and the decorative arts would dissolve into architecture, thereby unifying art with technics (Ferkai 2003:16). In the immediate post-war period of 1945 to 1949, constructivism inspired bold blueprints for the post-war rebuilding of Budapest and the construction of new public buildings, extending
and radicalizing the influence of interwar modernism. But its budding impact was abruptly halted by the communist political takeover that brought with it the aesthetic paradigm of socialist realism from the Soviet Union.\[2\]

In the eyes of architects and urban planners, the havoc wreaked by the war presented a unique opportunity to rectify the urban planning and development mistakes of earlier periods. The slowly emerging new buildings in the immediate aftermath of World War II built on the legacy of interwar modernism to radically rethink the structure and function of the city. Planners and architects passionately debated the need to “build the city anew” as opposed to simply “reconstructing the ruins.” The new architectural and urban planning journals, as well as the first post-war architectural and urban planning competitions offered lively forums to these efforts to fundamentally rethink the city. This short period of optimistic experimentation was undercut by a politically motivated shift in cultural policy and artistic expression, dictated by the Soviet Union, which launched an attack against constructivism while calling for a return to historicist, realist, and traditional art forms.

My paper will focus on the utopian visions that were hatched in these discussions and competitions and played a central role in the immediate aftermath of the war before the Communist political takeover in 1948 and the coercive introduction of Soviet architectural and planning policies in the early 1950s. First, the paper will show that generating utopian visions in a series of open architectural competitions held immediately after the war in 1945 was, in itself, a significant part of the reconstruction process. Second, it will highlight why and how such utopian blueprints are consequential even if they never materialize, and why unbuilt plans remain an indispensable part of the urban and architectural imagination.

The Aftermath of World War II and the Promise of New Beginnings

The siege of Budapest was among the longest and bloodiest of the urban battles of World War II (Ungváry 1998). It lasted a total of 102 days from October 29, 1944, to February 14, 1945, when the city unconditionally surrendered to the Red Army. In stark contrast, Berlin was taken in 2 weeks, Vienna in 6 days, while Paris and most other European capitals, with the exception of Warsaw, never became battlegrounds during the war. Hitler had declared Budapest a fortress city that had to be defended to the last man. When the siege finally ended and Budapest fell, the victory proved decisive for the Allies in their push towards Berlin. The scale of fighting and destruction inflicted on Budapest was comparable only with the sieges of Leningrad, Stalingrad, and Warsaw, the most devastating episodes of urban warfare during World War II. For Budapest, the siege in 1944–1945 was the most destructive of the 15 major sieges the city had endured over its long history, which qualifies it as one of the most besieged capitals in Europe, underscoring its geopolitical and military importance (Ungváry 1998:9). The physical and human toll of the war was enormous. The combined human losses, including deaths, Holocaust victims, and deportations by Soviet troops, amounted to nearly 100,000 people in Budapest (Stark 2000; Ungváry 1998). Overall, the city’s population fell from 1.2 million to 800,000, and in some downtown districts the size of the population was halved (Ungváry 1998:307). Before the siege, the city also suffered several bouts of heavy Allied bombing, and

\[2\] Constructivism became politically rehabilitated in the 1960s and returned to inform experimental projects for mass housing construction (Molnár 2005).
the cumulative destruction to the built environment was staggering. Nearly 5 percent of the housing stock completely vanished, 6.5 percent became uninhabitable, and an additional 16 percent was heavily damaged. Approximately 36,000 families became homeless (Sipos 2011; Ungváry and Tamási 2006).

Hardest hit of all were the public representative buildings that encapsulated the city’s history and cultural identity. The Castle District in the Buda Hills overlooking the Danube lay in ruins. The famous Lloyd Palace and the row of lavish hotels that lined and defined the Danube skyline on the Pest side were destroyed beyond repair. Nevertheless, the most expressive and painful symbol of the devastation remains undoubtedly the site of the collapsed bridges across the Danube. All the bridges were methodically blown up by withdrawing German troops during the siege. But the loss of the bridges was more than just symbolic. They did not merely offer visual accents to Budapest’s iconic cityscape, but served as important arteries of everyday life connecting not only the twin cities of Buda and Pest but also the eastern and western halves of the country.

The extent of the destruction is also made palpable by the fact that, although the clearing away of debris and rebuilding efforts began immediately following the end of the siege, three years later, in 1948, most building activity was still devoted to the reconstruction of damaged buildings and infrastructure.[3] It was a memorable event when the city government threw a little celebration on April 20, 1948, claiming that there were no longer any unrepaired roofs in Budapest (Prakfalvi, 1999a: 8). The reconstruction of some public buildings was even more protracted: the renovation and remodeling of the Buda Castle were completed only in 1966, while the art nouveau Elizabeth Bridge, destroyed in the war, was replaced by a modern suspension bridge in 1964.[4]

Meanwhile, a few new buildings began to sprout among the ruins, ushering in a short-lived but optimistic era between 1946 and 1949 that carried the promise of a new beginning. For architects and urban

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[3] To ensure that clean-up and reconstruction efforts proceeded smoothly, compulsory community service was introduced across the country, requiring four days of community service per month (or the payment of an equivalent monetary fee) from adult citizens (Ungváry and Tamási, 2006: 38).

[4] The reconstruction of the Buda Castle was in part also prolonged for political reasons. For an extended period, it was unclear how the building should be reused. Various scenarios were drawn up including suggestions to demolish it just as East Germans cleared away the Berlin Stadtschloss, or to turn it into the headquarter of the communist leadership until it was decided that it would host cultural institutions. The excavations that started to unearth the medieval remains of the Castle also slowed down the reconstruction process. As the reconstruction took off after socialist realism already vanished, the remodeling also involved large-scale modernist changes especially to the interiors but also to the façade.
planners, the destruction caused by the war contained a silver lining. Namely, the severely damaged urban fabric also presented a unique opportunity to rectify the urban planning and development mistakes of earlier periods. Virgil Borbíró, a prominent architect and important figure in the reconstruction, remarked that “during the painfully long fifty days of the siege, in the darkness of the air-raid shelter and in the midst of resounding explosions, we often pondered what exactly might have gotten destroyed from Budapest. We had secretly hoped that at least a couple of buildings that did not fit the cityscape would disappear” (Borbíró 1945:50). Planners and architects talked frequently about the need to “build the city anew” as opposed to simply “reconstructing the ruins” (újjáépítés instead of helyreállítás) (Fischer 1946).

Constructing a New City versus Reconstructing the Old

It was against this backdrop that large-scale physical devastation and lagging reconstruction were increasingly viewed as a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to fundamentally rethink and recreate the city. Influential architectural and urban journals such as Tér és Forma (Space and Form) and Budapest, which resumed publication in 1945, included a growing number of contributions to the discussion on whether Budapest should be merely restored or built entirely anew. Advocates of radical modernization emphasized how pre-war Budapest, just like other large metropolises, had been a product of real estate speculation that completely disregarded the hygienic and social needs of city dwellers, how the city had lost contact with nature and become unlivable, how the modernization of outmoded neighborhoods was impossible without reforming land ownership structure, and how the fact that housing was built to last for several generations was actually an obstacle to progress (Tér és Forma 1946; Major 1946). They uniformly agreed that the extensive damage caused by the war should be seen as a call to create new and better (more functional) structures in place of destroyed buildings that were replete with shortcomings (Major 1946:197).

Reflecting this zeitgeist, the reconstituted Budapest Council of Public Works (Fővárosi Közmunkák Tanácsa),[5] the agency in charge of planning and coordinating the rebuilding effort, together with the Budapest municipal government organized several architectural design competitions to envision the future Budapest. The entries were dominated by radical blueprints fashioned in the spirit of interwar modernism and constructivism. This is not surprising given that key members of the new Council of Public Works were also well-known representatives of the Hungarian Modern Movement, with József Fischer, the president of the Council, incidentally heading the Hungarian section of the legendary CIAM (International Congress of Modern Architecture). Key architectural competitions organized over the course of 1945 and 1946 included a competition to design high-rise housing settlements along the Danube bank in Pest (Magdolnaváros) that also proposed flat and building prototypes for mass production, as well as the complete overhaul of the badly damaged hotel row along the Danube in the city center.

However, the most ambitious, so-called idea-generating design competition (Újjáépítési ötletpályázat) organized in 1945 called for master concepts that would radically reimagine the structural foundations of the entire city, not just offer practical blueprints for the reconstruction of war damage. Many of the entries were lost, but...
the surviving documentation, which includes the summary assessment of the jury, reveals that, overall, the entries were quite eclectic. Some contenders simply ignored the architectural nature of the competition and submitted philosophical or moral treatises or, in one case, a poem (Vadas 1985). Even some of the more strictly architectural entries were at times not simply daring but phantasmagoric, like the one that recommended clearing away the entire Castle Hill. Yet the two competition entries that were awarded a divided first place and given broad press coverage were architecturally sophisticated, bold, constructivist-inspired plans for radically restructuring the city. The first winning entry, by architects László Acsay and György Masirevich, proposed a fundamental break with the traditional radial-concentric structure of Budapest in favor of a more rational and logical organization in the spirit of modernist functionalism. The architects foresaw the creation of a “strip-city” that involved the large-scale redevelopment of Budapest along the north–south axis, dividing it into single-use zones (residential, industrial, green areas, institutional) running along the Danube (Morvay 1946a, 1946b; Tér és Forma 1944–1945:11, 1947:2, 1947:10; Sipos 2011; Vadas 1985). The various north–south zones running parallel to the Danube would have served to rationalize and strictly separate key city functions, which were to be determined in relation to the strip’s respective distance to the river. The strip immediately adjacent to the Danube on the Pest side would have served as “the city” housing government institutions and office buildings. In comparison, the strip bordering on the river on the Buda side would have been turned into a spa-wellness-medical service zone, capitalizing on the abundant thermal springs, historical baths, and accompanying health care facilities in the area. The next zone in Pest would have served commercial and industrial functions, while its counterpart in Buda would have been turned into a low-rise residential sector. These were to be followed on both sides by a green strip developed by linking and extending already existing parks into a continuous green zone. The areas lying beyond the green belt would have served home to high-rise housing estates in both halves of the city. Transportation networks were planned to mirror the functional division of the strips and mapped onto a strict grid pattern, allowing for easy horizontal and vertical movement within the new rationalized urban system. Each zone was to have its own transportation channel in the form of an expressway with some cross-zone connecting roads. As the architects noted: “Just like in a department store, the elevator takes you to the floor where the relevant goods are to be found. The soothing rationality of the grid—in other words, pure geometry—will surpass the chaos of mazelike development” (Ferkai 2003:148, see also Ferkai 1997). A high-speed urban rail would have run parallel to the expressways, and the architects envisioned the establishment of no less than seven airports, somewhat overestimating the forthcoming growth in post-war air traffic.

[6] The interwar period generated several similar modernist urban plans, Le Corbusier’s “radiant city” (1933) being probably the best-known example, but there were local Hungarian precursors as well (Rácz 1941).
The second winning entry by Aladár Münnich, labeled the “four-corner city” (Négyországváros), also introduced the strip principle but did not carry it to the same extreme as the blueprint by Acsay and Masirevich. The plan’s main aim was to rectify the limitations of the historically grown city by modernizing and rationalizing urban structures and infrastructures. Münnich wanted to achieve this by relieving the small and overburdened traditional city center and decentralizing the city. He did not completely erase the concentric-radial structure of historical Budapest but tried to update it by introducing multiple centers: four “corners” within close range of the Danube and seven new centers in the outskirts and suburbs, linking various parts of the city into a pattern resembling crystal frost. This polycentric structure would have then been combined with the logic of largely monofunctional sectors running in north–west and south–east directions on the Pest and on the Buda side, respectively. Similar to the “strip-city” plan, one sector in Pest would have been developed into the “city” with hotel high-rises on the Danube bank, commercial buildings, and a row of skyscrapers for government buildings along a new traffic artery. Just like Acsay and Masirevich, Münnich envisioned a medical-recreational sector in the Buda hills by the Danube and a low-density residential sector for most of Buda. Industrial production would have been moved to the southern fringes of the city, and mass housing would have been erected beyond the skyscraper ring. He also inserted green belts in between each functional sector and additional radial green wedges where urban topography allowed for it.

Given the modernist-constructivist leanings of the “four-corner city,” the competition entry devoted extensive attention to the organization of urban transportation. Münnich expected a dramatic rise in car traffic and planned the construction of a number of expressways to follow the crystal frost pattern of urban centers and subcenters. His most ambitious suggestion was the establishment of a sunken expressway sandwiched between the two main concentric traffic arteries of the city (Kiskörút, Nagykörút) surrounded by the new row of skyscrapers hosting government offices. Münnich also argued that decentralization actually enabled the expansion of the small-scale historical center of Budapest.
Pest, the Deák Square–Erzsébet Square area, into a representative urban “forum.” This monumental new square “would have served as the site of public celebrations, recreational area as well as an outdoor car park” (Vadas 1985:54).\[7\]

Undoubtedly, both winning entries were more utopian than pragmatic. But the loud call for radically updating, rationalizing, and modernizing the pre-war city, the fascination with increasing mobility and car transportation and its far-reaching impact on the urban fabric, as well as the spell of a geometric aesthetics and strict functionalism that characterized the urban visions disseminated through the competition provide a clear testimony to the constructivist zeitgeist of the immediate aftermath of the war.\[8\] Endre Morvay, the journalist who introduced the two competition winners to the broader public on the pages of the premier city journal, Budapest, cautioned against jumping to conclusions about the unfeasibility of the blueprints for the future Budapest. He noted that the reviewed urban plans “will not appear utopian if we recall how, when a hundred years ago Széchenyi presented his fantastic dreams about the Hungarian capital, right after the devastation of the ‘Great Flood of Pest’ and...”
the failed War of Independence in 1848, nobody else dared to believe that Pest-Buda would one day emerge as a true metropolis” (Morvay 1946b:72).

Although none of the competition entries came close to realization and new construction was still on a very small scale, the competition designs both captured a new optimism for the future and outlined the general intellectual direction for architecture. Indeed, emerging new buildings also reflected the aesthetic and structural principles of architectural modernism that permeated the winning competition entries. Bus stations, government buildings, and trade union headquarters were erected in a modernist style in marked contrast with the interwar decades when modernism was employed overwhelmingly in residential construction. This bolstered the hope of architects that modernism would finally become the dominant architectural language of public architecture. The types of buildings that were considered the most

[9] In architecture and urban planning, unbuilt designs can be as influential as projects that never materialize. The best-known constructivist example is probably Tatlin’s Tower, the Monument to the Third International, designed by Vladimir Tatlin in 1919.
important public representative buildings, such as trade union headquarters, were also politically meaningful; they meant to signal the political democratization and social inclusiveness of a new post-war society (Prakfalvi 1999a, 1999c). The best examples of this transitory modernist period between 1946 and 1949 are the central bus station in Erzsébet Square, which was the first post-war modernist building to receive landmark designation, and the headquarters of the Hungarian Construction Workers’ Union (MÉMOSZ-székház, Fig. 8). However, with the rapid rise of the Communist Party, increasing Soviet influence, and the onset of the Cold War, 1948 brought a critical turning point in Hungarian politics with important repercussions for architecture and urban development.

**Political Markings of Urban Space, Communist Takeover, and Expanding Soviet Influence**

Meanwhile, the immediate post-war period also brought about significant transformation in the symbolic marking of urban space. There was strong pressure to physically highlight sweeping political changes – the fall of fascism and the Soviet Union’s military triumph over Germany and its allies – in public space. Several Soviet war memorials were installed in prominent public spaces with astounding rapidity following the end of the city’s siege. Three major memorials (in Szabadság Square, Vigadó Square, St. Gellért Square) were inaugurated already in 1945 as part of ritual May Day celebrations while the most monumental ensemble, the Liberation Monument on top of Gellért Hill, was completed by 1947. These memorials were typically ordered and in part erected by the Soviet military. The Hungarian government was simply expected to rubber-stamp the decisions by issuing decrees that officially “commissioned” the memorials while also picking up the tab for the materials and execution (Pótó 2001).

This first generation of Soviet war memorials in Budapest were actually part of a larger trend across Soviet liberated Europe that meant to clearly delineate the new Soviet zone of influence (Fowkes 2004). The Liberation Monument on Gellért Hill (Fig. 9) and the war memorial in Szabadság Square best capture this geopolitical significance and the extent of direct Soviet involvement in the process. In case of the Liberation Monument, the sculptor, Zsigmond Kisfaludi Strobl, was
handpicked by the head of the Allied Control Commission, Marshal Voroshilov, who extensively discussed plans for the monument with the artist while assigning Soviet advisors to supervise its construction. It was also Voroshilov who moved the site of the monument to Gellért Hill, being dissatisfied with the other two locations suggested by the City Council. The new location on top of Gellért Hill is supremely visible from afar and is the site of the fortifications that were built by the Habsburgs after the crushing of the 1848/49 Hungarian revolution and war of independence. Similarly, the memorial in Szabadság Square was placed in the heart of the government district, just across from the embassy of the United States, in a public square in which several irredentist monuments had been erected in the interwar period.[10]

Beginning in mid-1948, the political turmoil of the immediate post-war period came to an end, as the communists systematically eliminated their political opponents and consolidated the remaining political parties into the Hungarian Independent People’s Front, which they thoroughly controlled. In August 1949 a new constitution, based on the Soviet constitution, declared the People’s Republic and ushered

Postcard from the 1960s showing the Liberation Monument. The statue of the Soviet soldier in the middle was removed from the ensemble in 1993 (Source: köztérkép.hu)

[10] Incidentally, these two memorials are virtually the only ones that remain in place, as most Soviet war memorials and public statues associated with communist rule were removed after 1989 and transported to the “Statue Park” set up outside Budapest as a repository for communist urban relics. The Liberation Monument has actually managed to shed its communist connotations and become a popular symbol of the city. The statue of a Soviet soldier that was part of the ensemble was removed while the monument was symbolically transformed in a public art performance in 1992 and rechristened the Statue of Liberty (Boros 2004). The Soviet war memorial in Szabadság Square, however, remains contested and has been the target of repeated anti-communist attacks.
in the Stalinist period. The communist political takeover in 1948 brought with it swift and all-encompassing institutional centralization and the introduction of socialist realism in architecture and urban planning. The Budapest Council of Public Works was dismantled in 1948, and its remains were incorporated into the Department of Public Works within the Budapest Municipal Council. Local district governments in the city were reorganized into local councils in 1950, following the Soviet example. The municipal government of Budapest lost its autonomy and became subordinate to the national government and the Communist Party. It had no direct control over its own tax revenue and development plans. All resources for everyday operation and development projects were allocated by the state in the framework of centrally planned five-year plans. This situation eventually led to constant conflicts between municipal government officials and state officials with the latter usually disregarding urban planning expertise and ignoring the need for integrated and long-term planning at the municipal level. The new City Council also began renaming key city streets to mark the communist takeover. Street names deemed politically incorrect (e.g., commemorating religious institutions or figures) were changed to evoke left-wing political associations drawing inspiration from the history of the labor movement, Soviet historical figures and place names, or honoring anti-fascist activists.

Architectural design and planning were also nationalized. Private architectural studios disappeared, and architects were integrated into large state-owned architectural and planning bureaus that were organized following a functional division of labor. There was, for instance, one national architectural bureau for the design of housing, one for the design of industrial buildings, another for public buildings, and yet another for modular and prototype design.

In tandem with sweeping institutional transformation, the communist takeover also brought with it a new aesthetic paradigm in architecture and urban planning in the form of socialist realism. Socialist realism had been the dominant and officially approved language of artistic expression in the Soviet Union since the 1930s. It constituted a form of realist art that served as an important communist propaganda tool (Groys 1994). Socialist realist architecture had to be “socialist in content and national in form” while rooted in “progressive traditions.” This usually entailed re-anchoring architecture in a historicist (mostly neoclassicist) vocabulary. In urban planning, socialist realism underscored the need for monumentality, an understanding of the city as a work of art, and the importance of representative composition. The formula to translate these ideas into practice was again borrowed from the Soviet cultural canon. The forceful introduction of socialist realism across Eastern Europe in the early 1950s was yet another sign of the growing political and cultural influence of the Soviet Union (Åman 1992).

In Budapest, the Communist Party and the Ministry of Culture organized a series of high-profile debates meant to reeducate architects and planners while enforcing the key principles of socialist realism (Prakfalvi 1999b, 1999c; MDPKV APO 1951). Architectural modernism was denounced in these discussions as “formalist,” “wasteful,” and “elitist” – namely, inaccessible to the general working population. As the daily paper of the Communist Party, Szabad Nép (Free People), declared in 1949: “we want neither the ugly capitalist tenements nor the formalist buildings that mimic the whimsical taste of American architects. Our
buildings should reflect the confidence and taste of our people marching towards socialism” (n.a. 1949). The handful of modernist buildings erected after the war were singled out as the ultimate bad examples of “harmful formalism,” and the architects who designed them were often pressured to engage in public acts of self-criticism regretting their “mistakes.” Hungarian architects reluctantly conformed to socialist realism by turning to a Scandinavian influenced puritan neo-classicism (e.g., the “R” building of the Budapest Technical University designed by Gyula Rimanóczy, Fig. 10) or to the eighteenth-century classicist architecture of the Hungarian countryside (e.g., the building of the College of Applied Arts designed by Zoltán Farkasdy, Jolán Limpek, Olga Mináry, and Géza Mészáros).

In urban planning, socialist realism underscored the need for monumentality, an understanding of the city as a work of art, and the importance of representative compositions. The formula to translate these ideas into practice was again borrowed from the Soviet cultural canon. The central building blocks of socialist realist urbanity – in plans for Budapest, as in Moscow – included the design of a representative main square, a large open area for mass demonstrations (e.g., May Day celebrations), skyscrapers, and a lavishly ornamented subway. The public ownership of urban land was supposed to enable socialist architects and planners to organize these elements into a monumental composition.

The new principles of socialist realism were clearly in sharp contrast with the constructivist visions expressed in post-war architectural competitions and building activity. The primary reason why the ideas and blueprints that emerged in these early competitions were not incorporated into the reconstruction process was not so much because they were utopian but because of the sharp political and ideological turn that began in 1948. The shift also triggered an exodus among modernist-constructivist oriented architects: each of the three award-winning architects from the “future of Budapest” competition left Hungary around 1948, followed by scores of other, some very prominent, like-minded architects.[11]
Conclusion
The massive efforts to rebuild Budapest in the immediate aftermath of World War II carry some general lessons for post-conflict urban reconstruction. Large-scale destruction of the urban environment as a result of violent conflict – wars, revolutions, and sometimes even natural disasters – is also endowed with an opportunity for radical change. It will nearly always pose a serious dilemma between the urge to rapidly restore the city as it was before and the temptation to take advantage of the devastation and fill the void with something radically new (e.g., modernize basic infrastructure, upgrade socially impoverished segregated neighborhoods, introduce significant functional changes for various city parts, and establish new public spaces). But this is a quandary that cannot be resolved solely by building professionals – engineers, urban planners, architects. It should be decided not just on the basis of narrow technical criteria but authorized by a much broader social contract that involves the views of diverse urban publics. This is, for instance, why open, idea-generating architectural competitions – like the ones that spawned constructivist utopian visions for Budapest in 1945 – seem indispensable, even if they produce bold plans that cannot be executed down to every detail. Namely, they will create public visibility and spark public debate encouraging the participation of various groups of urban dwellers (see also Staničić 2018 for the post-Balkan Wars reconstruction of Belgrade).

In a similar vein, extensive urban destruction – increasingly referred to as urbicide since the destruction of Sarajevo in the Bosnian war in the 1990s – usually follows and is followed by political regime change. Thus, any reconstruction effort will be inevitably subject to pressing political demands. These, most immediately, include the removal of the most visible symbols of the ancien régime (e.g., memorials, statues, street names, and representative buildings) from urban space and the swift invention and introduction of symbols for the new regime. The political marking of urban space is meant to solidify the political and cultural vision (e.g., the socialist city in post-1945 Budapest or the “European city” in post-1989 Berlin) of the new state. While architects and urban planners are undoubtedly aware that large-scale urban reconstruction is more than just a technocratic exercise, they continue to be ill-equipped to productively channel the influence of politics into the reconstruction process.
References


Tér és Forma (1944-1946).


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ABSTRACT

Post-war reconstruction was a foundational experience for Eastern European architectural culture during socialism. The unprecedented task of rebuilding and the construction of new cities, towns and villages in the Soviet Union, Poland, Yugoslavia, and elsewhere brought about a radical rethinking of planning and architectural doctrines. New organizational forms of the profession were introduced; its links with research and industry were forged; and a socialist state apparatus was mobilized in order to integrate planning at all scales, from architectural to regional. Older debates and concerns, from the search for national styles since the late 19th century to the modernist reformism of the pre-war period, were reactivated in ways, at times forcible, that tuned into the socialist discourse. At the same time, post-war reconstruction gave Eastern European architecture and planning an unprecedented global visibility, whether as part of socialist propaganda within Khrushchev’s opening to the “Third World,” or through information efforts of international organizations, such as the UN.

It was on UN’s behalf that Warsaw’s chief architect, Adolf Ciborowski, travelled to Baghdad in 1962. He admired the ambition of the regime of Qasim (in power since 1958) to develop Baghdad as a more modern and more just city, but Ciborowski argued that this effort needed to be given a new framework of a revised master plan. His presentation of the post-war reconstruction of Warsaw and other Polish cities led to the invitation issued by the Amanat Al Assima, the Municipality of Baghdad, to Polish urban planners to participate in the tender competition of the new master plan of Baghdad. Their winning entry resulted in two master plans (1967, 1973) that guided the development of the city until the first Gulf war (1990) and beyond.

This presentation will show the ways in which these master plans learned from and adapted the experience of Eastern Europe’s post-war reconstruction to the conditions of Iraq under Qasim and the Ba’ath Party. These lessons included specific planning tools, such as urban norms aimed at an equal distribution of welfare (housing, education, health, culture), and a new approach to Baghdad’s historical heritage, in contrast to the previous, British-designed master plan (1956). But equally crucial were new ways of working on the ground. They included the mobilization of an interdisciplinary team of planners and scholars, the preparation of variants of plans and alternative development scenarios, and a comparative perspective that focused not only on Eastern European precedents but also on those in the neighboring countries, including Syria and Kuwait. Polish planners were embedded in Iraqi planning, administrative, educational, and research institutions, and this talk argues that this capillary infiltration impacted the plan for Baghdad’s development. This impact will be demonstrated by means of GIS-based archival research, with particular attention paid to the transportation network, green spaces, housing typologies, and heritage protection.

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In recent decades, there has been a paradigm shift in recovery and reconstruction. In this new approach, the emphasis has been put on the "peacebuilding" role of recovery/reconstruction. However, such a process is not straightforward. Post-disaster reconstruction is a complex process strongly influenced by the social, economic, cultural and institutional context.

The reconstruction process has to be faced through a multidisciplinary approach. This requires to build up a theoretical framework articulated around certain concepts: Modernity and heritage, continuity and mutations, long term / short term, globalization and specific identities, transfer of technologies and local know-how.

New intra-state conflicts with non-state actors create complex political emergencies that result in the destruction of the affected population’s political, economic, sociocultural and healthcare infrastructures, in addition to forced population displacement. They differ from previous conflicts in the sense that they are the direct result of sectarian or ethnic violence.

A quarter of a century after the end of the Lebanese war and based on the Beirut case, this intervention will try to define the specificities of post-war reconstruction in an age of globalization.
Almost 20 years ago, the International Union of Architects organized an international symposium in Beirut on the reconstruction of war-torn cities, in collaboration with the Lebanese Federation of Engineers and Architects. The Lebanese Civil War had just ended and the reconstruction of Beirut was still in its infancy. The demons of war had moved on to the countries of former Yugoslavia and the Dayton Agreement had just been signed, giving the illusion that post-cold war international cooperation was capable of finding viable solutions that would put an end to ethnic and sectarian conflicts. We thought these conflicts were the last expression of a century that had endured so many tragedies, like the tail of a comet that would soon disappear in the limbo of history. No one then could have imagined that the coming century would witness in its early years a new cycle of violence that would spread from Afghanistan and Iraq to Mali, Libya, Syria and Yemen and lead the world to this state of generalized latent warfare that we know today.

The symposium that we organized at that time was structured...
around several themes expressed in the form of a duality of concepts: Modernity and heritage, continuity and mutations, long term v/s short term, globalization and specific identities, transfer of technologies and local know-how; as well as the involvement of local communities in the process of reconstruction.

Twenty years later, I have the impression that these same themes could still be used to apprehend the question of the reconstruction of war-torn cities.

**Modernity and Heritage**

The first of these recurrent themes, which seems to come back as a leit-motiv in all the debates on the reconstruction of war-torn cities, concerns the relationship between modernity and heritage. The history of various reconstruction experiences is crisscrossed by quarrels between “Olds and Moderns”, and between “Preservationists and Innovators”.

Do we have to construct or to re-construct? In other words, should we seek to restore things “as they were before”, or on the contrary, should we strive to build a better environment, designed on entirely new bases?

This question arises in the form of concrete choices: should we preserve old road patterns, or should we introduce new transportation grids, more in line with future developments? Would it be possible to reconcile the preservation of a centuries-old urban fabric, often crumbled and falling apart, with the necessity of revitalizing urban life, enhancing circulation schemes and improving urban services?

Within the discourse on heritage protection, reconstruction has long been considered in the context of pure restoration. The reconstruction of the center of Warsaw after the Second World War appears as a particularly interesting case in this respect. In August 1944, during the Warsaw uprising, more than 85% of the city’s historic center was destroyed by Nazi troops. The reconstruction of the Old Town was implemented based on a project that privileged the reconstitution of all structures dating from the 14th to the 18th century on the basis of archival documents and drawings. The Warsaw reconstruction is thus commonly considered as the typical example of a restoration-based approach.

However, looking more thoroughly at the specificities of this particular case, we discover that the reconstructed city has little in common with the pre-war city since the selective memory favored to reconstitute the cityscape as it appeared in its “golden age” and not as it was immediately before the War. The decision was taken not to reconstruct 19th century additions as well houses that were built in the courtyards of medieval buildings. Moreover, some urban blocks were deliberately not reconstructed in order to unveil the panorama of city walls as well as the view of the city from the banks of the Vistula river and new open public spaces were created in order to enhance the quality of urban life.[2]

The reconstruction of the city of Le Havre on the banks of the Channel in French Normandy, heavily bombed during the Second World War, is another example of urban reconstruction. Contrary to the example of Warsaw, the approach adopted here did not propose to reconstitute the old city but rather to build a new city, symbol of a reborn France. [3]

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the systematic use of a modular grid and widespread prefabrication. However, although the reconstruction plan of Le Havre constituted a pioneering implementation of modern urban planning, the new plan integrated the city’s previous layout and its historic structures, respecting the direction of the pre-existing main roads and connecting the reconstructed city to the surrounding fabric.

The reconstructed cities of Warsaw and Le Havre were both inscribed on the UNESCO World Heritage List\[4\]. While these two examples are based on diametrically opposed approaches, they nonetheless represent two different ways of responding to the same problem, that of the modernization of the urban setting and the attitude towards heritage. But the very notion of heritage is far from being straightforward, since heritage, like tradition, is a social construct. After the implosion of the former Yugoslavia, a heated debate erupted among intellectual elites concerning the fate of the architectural and urban heritage of the Tito period that marked the city of Sarajevo and other cities of the country\[5\]. The issue of the legacy of the Socialists past was also raised after the decision of the Russian government to reconstruct the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in Moscow, which was destroyed under Stalin in 1931 to be replaced by the Palace of the Soviet, which was never built. Similarly, the decision taken by the Berlin Rathaus to rebuild the Hohenzollern Palace, once a principal residence of the Kings of Prussia, which was destroyed in 1950 by the Communist authorities to be replaced by the Palace of the Republic, generated a heated debate on the memory of the “Osties”\[6\].

Even nearer to our region, the heritage of the colonial era as well as that of Modernism are still often ignored, although they form part of our memory, in the same way as the remains of the Ottoman, Arab, Byzantine, Roman and Greek periods.

Faced with this multiplicity of situations and the extreme diversity of memorial traces, there is a great temptation to adopt a selective approach that retains from the past only that part which corresponds to the ideological choices carried by the main actors of the reconstruction project. The example of the reconstruction of downtown Beirut is particularly enlightening in this regard.

At the end of the Lebanese Civil War in 1991, Beirut was a shattered city, a city deprived of its heart. A general amnesty was declared for all crimes and abuses committed during the war while post-war trauma produced a general aspiration among Lebanese society to erase the memory of violence. An ambitious project was launched for the reconstruction of the historic center of Beirut, and entrusted to a private Real Estate Company named Solidere. Against the backdrop of an urban hecatomb where more than 80% of the buildings of the old center were demolished, the selective memory opted for the conservation of isolated fragments in the form of selected pieces where heritage became a mere tool for real estate promotion.

In this sense, the dialectic of modernity versus heritage became ultimately nothing more than the expression of a general problem, that of the social role of architectural and urban ideas and the way our vision of the present is affected by reinvented images of the past.
Continuities and mutations

The second theme we will address is that of the opposition between continuities and mutations. Is the reconstruction a simple reconstitution, a restarting of society before the disaster, a return to square one?

Rebuilding is, of course, a response to the urgent needs of battered populations, limiting the effects of the trauma produced by violence and preserving the benchmarks that ensure a minimum of social cohesion. In the case of civil wars, reconstruction is also intended to ensure a form of reconciliation between belligerents that allows the regulation of conflicts and the coexistence of various social communities in the same territory.[7]

Hence, the emphasis put on the “peacebuilding” role of recovery/reconstruction has led to a focus on symbolic cultural heritage potential to reconcile and “bridge” the divided societies. The desire to rebuild a destroyed symbolic artifact in a complex political context can also express the desire to neglect the traumatic separation produced by war. The old multicultural City of Mostar was largely destroyed during the 1990 conflict. The reconstruction of the old town and its iconic bridge in 2004 with the help of UNESCO has been presented as a symbol of reconciliation, international cooperation and the coexistence of different cultural, ethnic and religious communities. Though extraordinary for their scope, complexity, and symbolism, the efforts that revitalized Mostar’s historic district in architectural terms were nevertheless rarely synchronized with parallel rehabilitation programs in the political and social domains. The result was a lop-sided recovery in which the city regained its landmarks - most notably a facsimile reconstruction of the renowned Old Bridge - without regaining the public institutions that would provide income and reduce communal vulnerability[8].

Post-trauma reconstruction appears therefore as a complex process shaped by various and sometimes contradictory dynamics that cannot be reduced to the traditional destruction/reconstruction categories. As it would be illusory to deny the transformations provoked by the war or induced by the socio-economic dynamics of the post-war period, the reconstruction is necessarily a real re-composition, a global reshuffling in the balance of power where various actors have more or less the possibility of asserting their rights.

This issue was raised in the debate on the reconstruction of Beirut Central District by Solidere, the private company to which the reconstruction project was entrusted. Most of the pre-war fabric was destroyed and local inhabitants were moved out and replaced by new stakeholders. The result was encroaching privatization and the creation of a “corporate-city”, a privileged enclave separated from its environment.

The reconstruction of the southern suburbs of Beirut, destroyed during the 2006 Israeli war, is different, on the other hand. Planned, organized, and supervised by a special private agency, Wa’d, established to this end by Jihad al-Bina’ (a Hezbollah affiliated NGO), the project’s main aim was to re-settle the 20,000 displaced dwellers of the neighborhoods in an estimated 200 apartment buildings, extending over 40 hectares. The Wa’d project strove to retain all local inhabitants and offer them the possibility to return to newly rebuilt apartments similar in size and in the same location to the pre-war situation. But the marginalization


of public authorities and the lack of interest given to public spaces resulted in increased territorial segregation and the creation of an enclave entirely dominated by a sectarian political party.

A quarter of a century after the launching of the Solidere project and twelve years after that of Wa’d, we see that, despite divergent visions of pre-war built forms (that Wa’d sought to replicate and Solidere to erase) and also despite divergent positions vis-à-vis pre-war dwellers (that Wa’d sought to re-settle on site and Solidere to permanently displace), the two private agencies displayed nonetheless similar modes of operation and both projects resulted in producing secluded and reclusive spaces, separated from the rest of the city[9].

Looking at these experiences, we are forced to notice that the constellations of factors that guided the war continue to exercise their influence on the abrupt, if not violent, reconfiguration of the urban territory. On the basis of the new post-war equilibriums, mechanisms were put in place to allow the renegotiation of the terms of power and modes of sociability. Although political agreements aimed at ensuring a form of “reconciliation” between the belligerents allowed the regulation of conflicts in terms that do not question the coexistence of various communities in the same national territory, we must not forget that conflict remains at the heart of politics. The renewal of the social bonds involves confrontation, competing strategies and attempts to change the balance of power.

**The issue of the time scales**

The third theme that we need to address is that of the different time scales of reconstruction. Because they are prospective by their nature, reconstruction plans surpass the time of the human generation concerned by change, to reach another scale, that of the long-term history. Most of the reconstruction experiences throughout history have been the work of a generation that devoted all its energy to their implementation. These experiences have mobilized the efforts of entire societies for years, sometimes even decades. We can therefore understand that they have been marked by a common aspiration to go beyond the immediate responses to the specific problems generated by the destruction, to propose more holistic solutions. The theme of “the opportunity finally offered” is one of the recurring themes of all

reconstructions. The key issue arising in this context is that of the
definition of priorities. It is through this issue that many strategic
options are unveiled and more profoundly, the orientation we intend to
imprint on the evolution of society. In fact, all reconstruction experi-
ments strove to reconcile the necessity of providing urgent responses
to people’s needs with the implementation of a prospective project
that would give the reconstructed cities a historic depth.

In fact, the success of any reconstruction process is largely depen-
dent on the correct articulation between short-term needs of post
disaster reconstruction and long-term disaster risk reduction. In this
sense, it is fundamental that the contextual parameters that influence
the vulnerability of the impacted communities be taken into account
in the long-term reconstruction. In order to effectively reduce the gap
between the short and long-term needs, new integrative approaches
should be developed that tend to reduce the physical vulnerabilities
of the built environment along with the sociocultural, economic and
institutional vulnerabilities.

This issue is likely to be one of the major problems facing the historic
cities of Syria, Iraq and Yemen as soon as the reconstruction process
begins.

Reconstructing infrastructures, restoring water and sanitary net-
works, decontamination of “hot spots” to reduce the risk of epidemics
related to the accumulation of waste as well as scientific assessment
of sites affected by chemical weapons are among the priority tasks
to insure the safe return of refugees. However, in the case of some
historic cities listed on UNESCO World Heritage List, like the ancient
city of Sanaa or the old city of Aleppo almost entirely destroyed by the
fighting, the preservation of historic heritage represents a top priority
in the reconstruction process. But this task cannot be addressed on a
short-term basis since the identification of the remaining attributes
that convey heritage values is essential prior to any reconstruction.
It is crucial that the identification of these attributes be as complete
as possible so that damage or loss can be systematically recorded,
appropriate mitigation measures be implemented, impact on the
significance of the site be assessed, and options for recovery and
supporting actions can be identified.
Globalization and local specificities

The fourth theme I would like to address is that of the relationship between globalization and local specificities. Addressed in various ways since the industrial revolution and the introduction of mechanization, this question is raised in new terms with the emergence of the global market and the technological developments that are transforming the conditions of production as well as the mechanisms of distribution and consumption on a global scale. This phenomenon has seen rapid growth over the last two decades with the development of new communication strategies, the emergence of advanced technologies and the growth of new communication and transport channels. This rapid growth is taking place in parallel with the transformation of the world into a single market, across borders and nations. The reduction in production costs generalize consumption patterns, level market products and create new needs. Paradoxically however, global market and open borders produce unwanted backlash, exacerbating the dangers of exclusion and marginalization of some vulnerable population categories as well as surging tribalism. Unable to cope with the influx of innovations, traditional societies are subject to a violent shock that results in a dramatic break in the continuity of their history.

Here again, the example of the reconstruction of downtown Beirut is particularly enlightening. In the aftermath of the Oslo agreement, a peaceful solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict seemed at reach. The project for the reconstruction of Beirut Central District was based on the assumption that the Lebanese capital would soon regain its role as a main business and financial center in a pacified Middle East, becoming a primary node in the global economic network. This ambitious plan that strove to transform the old Mediterranean town into a global city was scuppered by the failure of the peace process, leaving the reconstructed central district as an elitist, isolated urban fragment in the middle of an urban chaos marked by the sectarian divisions of the war.

Another issue is that of the role of international aid in disaster situations. While some forms of aid may appear inadequate because they do not take into account the real situations on the ground, they can
also have a negative impact by preventing the establishment and development of local initiatives. In the absence of a special consideration given to the problems of the “receiving societies”, this aid may develop perverse processes whereby the forced introduction of imported technologies and the unilateral definition of priorities by the “donors” accentuate social fractures.

This issue will be central to the success of the reconstruction projects in Syria, Iraq and Yemen. The scale of destructions and the need to mobilize financial resources and technical skills require the involvement of the international community in the process of reconstruction. However, for international aid to become a factor of development, it is necessary to direct this aid towards strengthening the stabilizing and integrative factors present in the “receiving societies”, to organize reconstruction as a coherent process based on existing potentialities and to put up a clear strategy for capacity building.

**Involvement of local communities**

The fifth and final theme concerns the issue of the involvement of local communities in the reconstruction process. Since post-disaster reconstruction is a complex process strongly influenced by the social, economic and institutional context of the affected communities, the correct understanding of the aspirations of these communities, often competing or conflicting, requires the early participation of all stakeholders. This participation is crucial, not only for managing the immediate post-disaster situation, but also for the mitigation efforts aiming at building societies that are more resilient. It is hence a key element of post-trauma recovery.

To conclude, it is clear that there has been a paradigm shift in recovery and reconstruction with the development of new innovative approaches in recent decades. These new approaches that put an emphasis on improving the resilience of war-torn societies, are equally interested in spaces, forms and material traces, processes, activities, images, representations, rhythms and temporalities. It is through such a comprehensive approach that we must address today the question of the reconstruction of cities in a globalized world; an approach that privileges the attention to the collective memory that
founds the identity of social groups, the acknowledgment of the role of historical stratification and the recognition of the shared inheritance to allow the renewal of social links, gender diversity, mediation and reconciliation.
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